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Since 9/11, the NYPD has taken on what might be called a personal vendetta to never 
allow another terrorist attack to strike the citizens of New York City. It has developed a 
unique and controversial model that critics say consistently pushes the boundaries of the 
law and civil rights in an attempt to spy on and monitor the behavior of the residents of 
New York City in order to prevent another devastating attack. 
New York City is not the only place affected by the threat of domestic terrorism. 
Other municipalities have realized this threat and have attempted to establish methods to 
prevent the occurrence of a similar scenario in their locales. Many municipalities have 
attempted to develop their own version of a counterterrorism defense using their own 
ideas and following those from the NYPD. However, the NYPD model has been 
criticized for encouraging racial profiling and violating citizens’ civil liberties through 
their collection methods.  This thesis will suggest how other municipalities can utilize 
positive aspects of the NYPD model to deter and foil any future attempts to cause our 
nation harm. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since 9/11, the NYPD has taken on what might be called a personal vendetta to 
never allow another terrorist attack to strike the citizens of New York City. It has 
developed a unique and controversial model that critics say consistently pushes the 
boundaries of the law and civil rights in an attempt to spy on and monitor the behavior of 
the residents of New York City in order to prevent another devastating attack. 
The NYPD model is an aggressive counterterrorism and intelligence effort that 
separates the counterterrorism and intelligence missions into entirely different divisions. 
The intelligence division consists of highly trained intelligence analysts whose main 
responsibility is analyzing the information received from out in the field and reporting to 
higher authority. Those who operate in the field and collect the information have 
organized their effort through a mapping tactic to separate who lives where and what 
ethnicity they belong to. The data or information is then visualized geographically to 
understand the lay of the land. This technique not only encompasses the boroughs of New 
York, but the NYPD has also expanded their collection of information throughout 
different states around the country and even overseas. While utilizing informants and 
agents to gather intelligence, the NYPD has created their own version of the CIA and FBI 
within the department. 
New York City is not the only place affected by the threat of domestic terrorism. 
Other municipalities have realized this threat and have attempted to establish methods to 
prevent the occurrence of a similar scenario in their locales. Many municipalities have 
attempted to develop their own version of a counterterrorism defense using their own 
ideas and following those from the NYPD. However, the NYPD model has been 
criticized for encouraging racial profiling and violating citizens’ civil liberties through 
their collection methods.  This thesis will suggest how other municipalities can utilize 
positive aspects of the NYPD model to deter and foil any future attempts to cause our 
nation harm. It will attempt to answer the questions: what lessons does the New York 
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Police Department model offer for other police departments and communities around the 
United States in fighting against the domestic terrorism threat?  And, what aspects of the 
NYPD model should be handled at the federal level?  
B. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
The devastating events that occurred on September 11, 2001, prove that there are 
people in this world who will go to great lengths to cause the most chaos and terror to the 
United States, its political and financial infrastructure, and the American people. And 
although there has not been another attack within the United States on the scale of 9/11 
since 2001, the threat remains. The danger of a terrorist attack is evident in the numerous 
plots that law enforcement foil on a yearly basis. The Heritage Foundation has recently 
released a report that describes at least 50 foiled terror plots within the boundaries of the 
United States since 9/11. These foiled plots, all thwarted by U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies, have shown that America faces a significant homegrown and 
domestic terrorism threat.1 
The ability of would-be terrorists to travel abroad has shortened the radicalization 
period and strengthened the desire for collective revenge against the United States among 
some individuals inspired by radical ideology. The ability to travel without suspicion has 
expanded the terrorist network’s ideology and increased the demand. For example, in 
June 2011, during an undercover operation in New Jersey, the NYPD arrested and 
eventually convicted Mohamed Mahmoud Alessa and Carlos Eduardo Almonte for 
attempting to fly to Somalia to join the terrorist group al-Shabab in order to learn and join 
the fight to kill Americans.2 
Largely due to the significant increase in extremist websites and social circles on 
the Internet, radical ideology has become easily available to individuals surfing the web 
looking for a sense of belonging. This proliferation of radical content has significantly 
                                                 
1 James Jay Carafano, Steven Bucci, and Jessica Zuckerman, “Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: 
The Homegrown Threat and the Long War on Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, April 25, 2012, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/fifty-terror-plots-foiled-since-9–11-the-homegrown-
threat-and-the-long-war-on-terrorism. 
2 “With CIA Help, NYPD Built Secret Effort to Monitor Mosques, Daily Life of Muslim 
Neighborhoods,” Associated Press, August 24, 2011, 7. 
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increased the potential of the lone-wolf actor to become radicalized and act independently 
at home or abroad. Whether the individual suffers from alienation, financial poverty, 
brainwashing, or decided to take up a cause from a radical organization, trends do exist 
and have bolstered since 9/11. According to the Heritage Foundation, there have been 
examples of 15 lone-wolf domestic terrorist threats foiled by law enforcement agencies.3 
With the rise of domestic and homegrown terrorism within the United States, it is 
evident that there must be an increase in counterterrorism and intelligence prevention 
measures. Law enforcement agencies throughout the country are the first responders in 
the event of terrorism; they patrol and observe the daily lives of the people throughout 
their municipality, and should be the ones who conduct the majority of the intelligence 
and counterterrorism operations. Unlike federal agents who only enter communities as 
part of an active investigation, local law enforcement personnel normally live and grow 
up within the vicinity and know the area inside and out. The responsibility should be 
placed where the issue can be handled more efficiently and where proper leadership can 
effectively decide what’s best for that area. Community members trust their local and 
state law enforcement members due to the realization that they are essentially part of the 
community. Because they live in the community they develop gut instincts that gives 
them the sense of what is wrong. For this reason, it is important to understand the NYPD 
counterterrorism model and whether other communities can copy it.4 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Since 9/11, many experts have argued the NYPD has been the model for local and 
state municipalities to follow. However, not everybody agrees with this statement. The 
NYPD has significantly pushed the boundaries of racial profiling and some have 
criticized their abuse of civil rights. Recent reports have found the ethnic mapping 
techniques used by the NYPD’s counterterrorism team violate the rights of minorities.5  
Informants hired explicitly based on their language and ethnic backgrounds are employed 
                                                 
3 “Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11.” 
4 Mayer, “Effective Counterterrorism,” 1. 
5 Star-Ledger Editorial Board,  “NYPD probe of N.J. Muslims an insidious betrayal,” NJ.COM, 
February 23, 2012, http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2012/02/nypd_probe_of_nj_muslims_an_in.html. 
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to observe mosques, known as mosque crawlers. NYPD officers, called rakers, then troll 
ethnic neighborhoods performing surveillance operations and receiving reports from their 
informants. If an informant discloses information that deems to be suspicious activity, the 
intelligence department labels this area a hotspot. David Cohen, the NYPD’s first 
intelligence chief, refers to this tactic as “Raking the Coals for Hot Spots.”6 
The mapping tactic led by NYPD’s intelligence department has led to serious 
accusations of racial profiling and civil-rights violations that often land NYPD officials in 
court battling law suits over violations of the Handschu v. Special Services Division 
decision in 1971. This decision was the result of the NYPD spying on students, civil-
rights groups, and suspected Communist sympathizers during the 1950s and 1960s. It 
produced strict federal guidelines that prohibit the NYPD from collecting information 
about political speech unless it is related to potential terrorism or there is “specific 
information” that the group is linked to a crime that had been committed or was about to 
be committed.7  A recent report from the American Civil Liberties Union found that the 
NYPD intelligence surveillance operations never resulted in a lead to a terrorism 
investigation specifically related to the mapping techniques. The report supports the 
argument of critics that the NYPD’s Demographics Unit spied on Muslim New Yorkers, 
not because they were suspected of criminal activity, but based on ethnicity and native 
language with no leads.8 
Although the mapping technique has been severely criticized as violating the 
innocent’s rights and racial profiling, this technique is not the only tool available to the 
NYPD. The annual $178 million budget just for intelligence and counterterrorism, which 
does not even include the private donations through different foundations that support the 
different divisions of the NYPD, allows the department to hire the best intelligence 
officers and buy the highest technology in monitoring and software capabilities on the 
                                                 
6 “With CIA Help.” 
7 NYPD Testimony on Muslim Surveillance Operation Highlights Futility of Spying on Innocent 
People American Civil Liberties Union, August 21, 2012, http://www.aclu.org/national-security/nypd-
testimony-muslim-surveillance-operation-highlights-futility-spying-innocent. 
8 NYPD Testimony on Muslim Surveillance. 
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market.9  This budget allows for an expenditure on intelligence and counterterrorism 
efforts that seems impossible for other municipalities to follow. 
The constant struggle between the need to respect civil liberties and the 
prevention of domestic terrorism, as well as the NYPD’s large budget compared to other 
cities, are the most important problems or issues that are raised by the major research 
question.   However, this thesis will hypothesize there are several good qualities found in 
the NYPD model that other municipalities can utilize as well as other techniques that do 
not bear the burden of fiscal difficulties. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The topic of law enforcement’s capabilities in the fight against terrorism has been 
debated heavily within the past ten years. During the last few years the discussion has 
intensified, based on the increasing number of foiled terrorist threats, the rise of 
homegrown and domestic terrorism, and the recent efforts to call on the federal courts to 
prevent the NYPD from racial profiling and domestic spying. Several reports and articles 
have been written over the years that present both sides of the debate: should local law 
enforcement departments continue to enhance their capability in preventing a terrorist 
attack, or should the federal government mostly handle this? 
Although traditionally state and local officials have responded to local security 
needs, in recent years the U.S. government has taken a clearly defined and more active 
role in federalizing the homeland security mission. A report from the Heritage Center for 
Data Analysis argues states themselves could do the job better if they had adequate 
resources.10  This report describes the need for a larger role of the local municipalities in 
the fight against the prevention of domestic terrorism. The report quotes Alexander 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 17 as follows: “There is one transcendent advantage 
belonging to the province of the State governments, which alone suffices to place the  
 
                                                 
9 Stein, “NYPD intelligence detectives go their own way,” 1. 
10 Matt A. Mayer, “Effective Counterterrorism: State and Local Capabilities Trump Federal Policy,” 
Heritage Foundation, June 3, 2009, 1. 
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matter in a clear and satisfactory light—I mean the ordinary administration of criminal 
and civil justice.”11  This quote supports the view in favor of expanding the NYPD model 
to other communities. 
Those that argue for the NYPD model claim that since the disastrous moments of 
9/11, the federal government has created and reorganized over several hundred 
government organizations, expanded the intelligence efforts throughout the country, and 
awarded several hundred secret clearances to both military and civilians working for the 
government.12  However, despite this monumental effort by the government, terrorism 
plots continue to unfold within the United States. The determination of Islamist 
extremists to bring death and chaos to the American people has created a serious debate 
over the effectiveness of how the U.S. conducts the “homegrown” war on terror and 
whether these efforts should be restructured.13 
A paper written by the NYPD in 2007 concludes that the threat confronting 
Americans now comes more from homegrown terrorists than from overseas groups. The 
authors state, “These Homegrown Terrorists follow remarkably similar behavior patterns. 
Participants in the 11 anti-Western terrorism plots analyzed in the report all went through 
four stages on the path from unremarkable to violent: Pre-radicalization, Self-
identification, Indoctrination and Jihadization.”14  This report is an extensive and 
explicitly detailed analysis on the topic of homegrown terrorism threat that came out of 
the intelligence office of the NYPD, and suggests that local level officials can produce 
high quality analysis. 
According to recent articles and interviews, The NYPD has taken its role of 
preventing terrorism from reaching their doorstep to heart. The effects of 9/11 pushed the 
NYPD to reorganize into the country’s most aggressive domestic intelligence agency. 
                                                 
11 Mayer, “Effective Counterterrorism,” 1. 
12 Judith Miller, “The Shield We Need: The best defense against terrorism is not in D.C.–it’s the 
NYPD model,” New York Daily News, July 25, 2010. 
13 Judith Miller, “On the Front Line in the War on Terrorism,” City Journal, Summer 2007. 
14 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt Senior Intelligence Analysts NYPD Intelligence Division, 
“Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” report by the New York City Police Department, 
2007. 
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The reorganization began in 2002 when Police Commissioner Ray Kelly took over the 
NYPD and David Cohen became the NYPD’s first Intelligence Chief. Both Kelly and 
Cohen shared the belief that the NYPD could not solely rely on the Federal Government 
to prevent terrorism in their area of responsibility. Cohen would tell his staff that, “If 
anything goes on in New York, it’s your fault.”15 The attitudes represented by Cohen and 
Kelly gave the staff a sense of responsibility. This forced the men and women to erase the 
mindset of relying on the federal government for help, and to realize that New York was 
their city and they had to do whatever means necessary to protect it. The NYPD created 
its first dedicated intelligence division complete with undercover agents, informants, 
analysts, a community mapping effort, a terrorism cyber unit, a small army of linguists, 
and even domestic and overseas presence in other states and 11 other countries.16 
Amanda Ripley of Time Magazine states that the release of the Silber and Bhatt 
paper, “Radicalization in the West,” “will spur the federal government ostensibly leading 
the war on terror to show more faith in the general public’s ability to digest serious 
intelligence.”17  With the understanding that such a detailed and explicit report came 
from a local law enforcement department, other law enforcement agencies could digest 
the knowledge needed to pursue trends outlined with the report and understand the 
potential ingredients for the making of a homegrown terrorist. Ripley’s argument 
supports those who believe law enforcement should take a stronger hand in domestic 
intelligence and counterterrorism. 
The importance of having intelligence analysts is crucial to the counterterrorism 
process. Analysts are able to inform detectives and enhance their credibility when dealing 
with potential sources out in the field. They are able to dissect the information and give 
knowledge to the officers out in the field in order to improve their duties as undercover 
agents or those investigating a lead. Recommendations from the New American 
                                                 
15 “With CIA Help.” 
16 Judith Miller, “Terror Target: Manhattan,” The Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2010, 2. 
17 Amanda Ripley, “How to Look at Homegrown Terrorism,” Time U.S. Aug. 16, 2007. 
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Foundation argue local law enforcement departments should integrate trained and 
educated Intelligence analysts within their departments as is done in the NYPD model.18  
Those who argue against the NYPD model, such as civil rights activists, claim the 
organization steps beyond the border of civil liberties and racial profiling. Criticism from 
the FBI focuses on the New Jersey surveillance controversy, where NYPD officers were 
found conducting surveillance operations on Muslims inside the state without notifying 
New Jersey officials.19  New Jersey’s FBI chief, Michael Ward, also has been extremely 
critical of the NYPD for not conducting the operations within the umbrella of the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force, to which the NYPD belongs. He said, “The actions undermined 
the bureau’s own efforts by sowing distrust of authorities among Muslims and weakened 
national security.”20 
Critics of the NYPD model make several arguments. First, they argue the process 
“Opens the door to racial profiling ... and exposes law-abiding people to government 
prying into their private affairs without just cause.”21  Several organizations including the 
New York Civil Liberties Union claim the NYPD mapping project unfairly singles out 
the Muslim community as the primary concern for which results in unfair police 
surveillance and spying. 
Second, other critics such as Judith Miller argue that the financial expenditures 
and the size of the NYPD force means it cannot be an effective model for other 
municipalities to follow. Miller notes that a Washington-based think-tank argues the 
NYPD has the resources, “To do things that other departments cannot.”22  The NYPD has 
over 50,000 employees and 36,000 sworn officers to conduct law enforcement activities 
and protect eight million citizens. The next top five largest U.S. police departments 
                                                 
18 Brian Fishman and Andrew Lebovich, “Countering Domestic Radicalization,” New American 
Foundation, National Security Studies Program, June 2011. 
19 Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, “NYPD built secret files on mosques outside NY,” Associated 
Press, Feb. 22, 2012 
20 Samantha Henry, “N.J. finds NYPD Muslim surveillance is legal,” Associated Press, May 24, 2012, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/24/nj-finds-nypd-muslim-surveillance-legal/?page=all 
21 McNamara, Testimony, Mike German and Jay Stanley, “Fusion Center Update,” ACLU July 2008, 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusion_update_20080729.pdf. 
22 Judith Miller, “On the Front Line.” 
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combined do not have as many employees. Experts argue that conducting a 
counterterrorism effort on the scale of the NYPD, which includes constant surveillance, 
undercover infiltration of suspected groups both local and overseas, and the analytical 
work to organize and make sense of all the collected intelligence, requires a work force of 
personnel on the scale of the NYPD, which is entirely unrealistic for other cities around 
the country. Simply put, other municipalities do not have the extra personnel or staff to 
conduct these extra duties.23 
Finally, several scholars have argued some of the aspects of the NYPD model 
should be handled at the Federal level. The Intelligence Division’s International Liaison 
Program (ILP), for example, has NYPD officers in 11 foreign capitals. The main mission 
of the ILP is to gather information and gain perspectives around the world. They act as 
the eyes and years of the NYPD to access international intelligence.24 
The ILP has been seen as a rogue intelligence division with no oversight and an 
outrageous amount of funding. While NYPD officers are stationed in the 11 foreign 
capitals, they work for no one but the NYPD. They operate outside the authority of top 
U.S. officials abroad including American ambassadors and CIA station chiefs, who 
operate as the head of U.S. intelligence in foreign countries. The NYPD officers are not 
official members of the country team, and they do not have the top-secret clearances and 
equipment to receive or send classified information. The NYPD officers travel on tourist 
passports. They live in hotels or apartments. Their out-of-channels status makes them 
virtually useless to other intelligence or police agencies, both U.S. and foreign. The 
argument is being made that the duties undertaken by the NYPD’s ILP fall beyond the 
responsibilities of local law enforcement and their presence becomes more of a hindrance 
than any type of assistance.25 
                                                 
23 Ibid.  
24 “With CIA Help,” 7. 
25 Jeff Stein, “NYPD Intelligence Detectives go their own way,” Washington Post, November 10, 
2010.  
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The research involved in answering the question of this thesis consists of a 
detailed study on the subject of law enforcement’s efforts in preventing further terrorist 
attacks. This thesis will thoroughly review articles, interviews, case studies and a few 
statistical analyses done over the past eleven years to help assist in answering the 
research question. This thesis includes a detailed case study of the NYPD and the 
counterterrorism model developed after 9/11, and examines the intelligence and 
counterterrorism capabilities of other local law enforcement departments, which include 
case studies from the Los Angeles, Chicago, and Boston Police Departments. 
This thesis recognizes aspects of the NYPD model that benefit other 
municipalities, as well as those that should not be replicated. This thesis also identifies 
aspects of the model that should not be handled by any law enforcement agency including 
the NYPD, and recommends those aspects be handled at the federal level. Several law 
enforcement agencies have interpreted the counterterrorism mission and the legalities of 
the Patriot Act in their own unique way. A study that depicts what agencies have done in 
the past can successfully make recommendations for future decisions and effectively 
answer the question of this thesis. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, 
followed by Chapter II, which addresses what domestic terrorism is, the effect it has had 
on our nation since 9/11, and evidence of radicalization within the boundaries of the 
United States. Chapter III is a case study of the NYPD model. This chapter analyzes and 
defines the model, as well as depicts the positive and negative aspects including the good, 
bad, and ugly facets of the model. Chapter IV examines the intelligence and 
counterterrorism capabilities of other local law enforcement departments, including case 
studies of the Los Angeles and the Boston Police Departments. This chapter examines 
these municipalities and describes what law enforcement agents outside the NYPD have 
done. The final chapter is the conclusion. This chapter examines specific lessons from the 
NYPD model and suggests which aspects would be beneficial to local law enforcement 
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agencies. This chapter will also summarizes what was researched, the nature of the 
arguments made, how the answer to the question was reached, and what pre-existing 
views were challenged. 
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II. DOMESTIC TERRORISM: FIGHTING THE LOCAL THREAT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The horrific events of September 11, 2001, revealed that the cities of the United 
States are vulnerable to an attack. These events prove that there are people in this world 
who will go to great lengths to cause the most chaos and terror to the United States, to its 
political and financial infrastructure, and to the American people. The damage sought by 
terrorists and their organizations can be both physical and psychological. The term 
“terrorism” has been around for centuries as a political tool to incite fear and panic. 
However, a new set of terms has emerged this past decade, including domestic terrorism, 
homegrown terrorism, and the lone wolf terrorist, all of which have grown in importance 
and have begun to threaten our way of life. 
This chapter will define these new terms according to passed by Congress and 
expressed throughout academic studies. The second section of this chapter will describe 
the effect domestic terrorism has had on our nation since 9/11. The last section of this 
chapter will argue why local law enforcement can do a better job handling and preventing 
the threat of domestic terrorism than federal authorities. This chapter will begin 
constructing the framework of this thesis in order to successfully answer the questions of 
this thesis. 
B. WHAT IS DOMESTIC TERRORISM? 
Ten years after the devastating attacks on 9/11, policy makers, including in the 
Department of Homeland Security, struggle to appropriately define and assign 
responsibility to the term domestic terrorism and related terms. Currently there are 
several versions of these terms, which this section will identify. The terms considered 
throughout the federal, state, local entities include domestic terrorism, homegrown 
terrorism, and lone wolf terrorism. There are several versions of these definitions. The 




difficult to prosecute a suspect in court, but it also makes it difficult to understand the 
responsibility between the law enforcement agencies at all levels from federal down to 
the local level. 
Since 1983, the U.S. government has defined terrorists as only, “those who 
perpetrate premeditated, politically motivated violence against non-combatant targets.”26  
After the devastating events on 9/11, the Bush Administration and Congress produced the 
USA PATRIOT ACT, which enabled law enforcement officials to track down and punish 
those responsible for the attacks on 9/11 and to protect against any similar attacks. 
According section 802 of the Patriot Act, Domestic Terrorism is defined as acts that: 
1. Involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or of any State: 
2. Appear to be intended 
a. To intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
b. To influence the policy of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; or 
c. To effect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and 
3. Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States27 
Critics of the Patriot Act wondered why the administration felt the need to expand 
the definition to include a wide variety of domestic criminal acts.28  However, now that 
                                                 
26 Statement of Honorable John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice Oversight: 
Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism, Hearings Before the Committee on the 
Judiciary United States Senate, 107th Congress, First Session Serial No. J-107–50 (Dec. 6, 2001) 316. Also 
quoted from Manas Mohapatra, “Learning Lessons from India: The Recent History of Antiterrorist 
Legislation on the Subcontinent,” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (Northwestern 
University), Vol. 95, No. 1 (Autumn 2004), 339. In this article, Mohapatra argues India is an example of a 
country that manipulates their legislation to fight against the growing threat of terrorism. The author then 
compares this legislation change to the U.S.’s bill passed called the Patriot Act and the effects it has on 
civil liberties. 
27 USA PATRIOT ACT 802,115 Stat.at 376, Definition of Domestic Terrorism, PUBLIC LAW 107–
56—OCT. 26, 2001. 
28 Mohapatra, “Learning Lessons from India,” 339. The argument from the author here is that there is 
a tendency for governments to take advantage of the generalized definition of terrorism to neutralize 
political opponents and minority groups comparing legislation changes of India to the U.S. legislation. 
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the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 was passed, nicknamed the PATRIOT 
Act II, the focus of this nation is to do whatever it takes to defeat the threat of terrorism 
despite civil libertarian groups and others that oppose the Act. The FBI simplifies the 
definition stating shorthand; domestic terrorism is “Americans attacking Americans 
based on U.S.-based extremist ideologies.”29  Despite the vague definition, the criminal 
aspect of the meaning of domestic terrorism provides a strong argument for the increased 
law enforcement presence in the counterterrorism field. 
Another term used throughout law enforcement and written about in numerous 
articles is Homegrown Terrorism. Although there is no official definition, The Violent 
Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007 approved by the 
House of Representatives in October 23, 2007 attempted to define this term as follows: 
The term ‘homegrown terrorism’ means the use, planned use, or 
threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, 
or based and operating primarily within the United States or any 
possession of the United States to intimidate or coerce the United States 
government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.30 
Another way to define homegrown terrorists, according to the Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University, is to 
separate the meaning into three categories. These categories include immigrants and 
visitors, legal or illegal second and third generation members of the Muslim diaspora 
community, and converts to Islam. The study also found that homegrown terrorism could 
be grouped into two general categories. These categories include those that would do 
                                                 
29 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Domestic Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era,” September 7, 2009, 
http://www.fbi.gov/ news/stories/2009/september/domterror_090709. 
30 H.R. 1955 (110th): Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007.  
110th Congress, 2007–2009. Text as of Aug 02, 2007. The bill was passed by the House of Representatives 
on April 19, 2007, and introduced to the Senate on August 2, 2007. However, the bill failed to pass during 
the 110th Congress. Although this bill did not become law, the definition seems to reflect common 
thinking. 
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harm in the United States and those that provide support for terrorism abroad. This 
definition focuses on the Islamic radicalization aspect of Homegrown Terrorism.31 
Homegrown terrorists become who they are through a radicalization process 
where an individual or group adopts extreme Islamic views and justifies acts of violence, 
criminality, and terrorism based on those views.32 Silber and Bhatt of the NYPD argue,  
“Participants in the 11 anti-Western terrorism plots analyzed in the report all went 
through four stages on the path from unremarkable to violent: Pre-radicalization, Self-
identification, Indoctrination and Jihadization.”33  The definitions of this process are 
defined as follows: 
4. Pre radicalization–defined as the point of origin for individuals before they 
begin the progression.  
5. Self-Identification–the phase where individuals are influenced by both 
internal and external factors where they begin to explore Salafi Islam. In 
this stage they begin to gradually drift away from their old identity and 
begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this 
ideology as their own 
6. Indoctrination–the phase in which an individual increasingly intensifies 
his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without 
question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is 
required to support and further the cause.  
7. Jihadization–the phase in which members of the cluster accept their 
individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as 
holy warriors or mujahedeen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational 
planning for the jihad or a terrorist attack.34 
Another term that is frequently used according to the FBI strategic plan of 2005–
2009 is the lone wolf. The plan states the most significant domestic terrorism threat over 
                                                 
31 Kimberley L. Thachuk, Marion E. “Spike” Bowman, and Courtney Richardson, “Homegrown 
Terrorism: The Threat Within,” Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense 
University, May 2008. 
32 Thachuk, Bowman, Richardson “Homegrown Terrorism,” 3. 
33 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt Senior Intelligence Analysts NYPD Intelligence Division, 
“Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” 2007 New York City Police Department. 
34 Silber and Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West.” 
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the next five years will be the lone actor, or “lone wolf” terrorist.35 This type of 
homegrown terrorist draws ideological inspiration from formal terrorist organizations, 
and remains extremely anonymous limiting law enforcement detection and prevention 
capabilities. Despite their unnatural planning methodology and limited resources, they 
can create high profile; destructive attacks that can often cause substantial infrastructure 
damage and create complete chaos.36 
According to Dr. Peter J. Phillips, “Lone wolf terrorism is terrorism perpetrated 
by a person operating alone who conceives and directs his own actions outside of any 
formal or informal command structure.”37  The Center of Technology and National 
Security Policy adds that homegrown terrorists range from lone wolves who wish to 
perpetrate an attack, to “groups who are a self-recruited, self-trained, and self-
executing.”38  The study continues that lone wolves have “few, if any, connections to an 
international conspiracy”39 Lone wolves have been found to have trained with and 
continually maintain connections to the al Qaeda transnational networks, and may have 
been implanted as “sleeper cells” by al Qaeda supporters in a particular country who are 
bent on conducting a medium or long term terrorist mission.40 
The Congressional Research Service defines lone wolf terrorism as follows: 
Lone wolf terrorism involves terrorist attacks carried out by persons who 
(a) operate individually, (b) do not belong to an organized terrorist group 
or network, and (c) whose modi operandi are conceived and directed by 
the individual without any direct outside command hierarchy.41 
                                                 
35 Federal Bureau of Investigation Strategic Plan: 2004–2009, 27, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=466149. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Dr. Peter J Phillips, “Prospect Theory, Lone Wolf Terrorism, and the Investigation Process,” 
University of Southern Queensland–Faculty of Business, July 9, 2012. 
38 Thachuk, Bowman, and Richardson, “Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat Within,” 4. 
39 Ibid., 4. 
40 Ibid., 4. 
41 Jerome P. Bjelopera, “The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress,” 
Congressional Research Service, May 15, 2012, 55. 
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The CRS study stresses this definition of a Lone Wolf is merely how one 
operates. Lone Wolves can create broad ideologies and use this to justify their extremist 
actions. Lone wolves are not plugged into the different terrorist organizations but operate 
under the justification of their own ideology, which has made defining this movement 
difficult. 
The terms defined in this chapter have had several interpretations by scholars, law 
enforcement, and judicial officials. Domestic terrorism is more generally defined, in the 
terms of this thesis, as any terrorist attack that happens within the borders of the U.S. and 
its territories. Homegrown Terrorism is an example of domestic terrorism that is a 
gestated plan or plot both developed and carried out in the U.S. A Lone wolf homegrown 
terrorist is an individual under the definition of a Homegrown Terrorism developing and 
carrying out a terrorist attack completely independent from any organization by may 
idealize a group or organization’s political agenda.   This example is by far the most 
dangerous and difficult to prevent. 
C. IS THERE A SERIOUS DOMESTIC THREAT? 
Since 9/11, the Heritage Foundation has kept a running tally on the domestic 
terrorist plots foiled by the FBI and local law enforcement agencies. A recent foiled 
attempt occurred in Chicago, which marks the 52nd attempt in the past 11 years. An 18-
year-old American citizen named Adel Daoud attempted to detonate a car bomb outside a 
local bar in downtown Chicago. This individual, who was active in online Jihadi forums 
and chat rooms, expressed a desire to commit several other terrorist activities, which 
included 29 possible targets before settling on the bar.42 
In May 2012, the FBI arrested five individuals who planned to blow up a 
Cleveland area bridge. Each suspect, being an American civilian, had developed a unique 
anarchist ideology without any connection to Islamist extremism. The manner in which 
this particular plot was foiled was no different than any other foiled Islamist extremist 
plot. This plot resembles many other foiled plots we see today. Understanding proper 
                                                 
42 Jessica Zuckerman, “Chicago Bombing Attempt Marks 52 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11,” The Heritage 
Foundation, September 17, 2012, 55. 
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counterterrorism techniques and procedures may lead to the prevention of any type of 
terrorism, whether it is radicalized Islamist or ideological driven youth wanting to cause 
chaos and destruction to their surrounding municipality.43 
As international travel becomes more popular and easier for all citizens to utilize, 
the same can be said for would-be terrorists who have no previous indications of being a 
threat. This allows would-be terrorists to travel abroad and shortens the radicalization 
period. The global operating environment for terrorist networks has enabled the 
homegrown terrorist to become more appealing to al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks. 
Homegrown terrorist actors can create a bridge between the U.S. and the other regions of 
the world where terrorist networks are in control. The homegrown terrorist located in the 
United States becomes the puppet at the hands of a terrorist organization located halfway 
around the world. This was evident during the September 2009 foiled plot of Najibullah 
Zazi in his attempt to bomb the New York City subway system. Zazi purchased large 
quantities of chemicals used to make a TATP bomb, the same type used in the London 
Underground bombing in 2005. Zazi traveled to Pakistan where he received training in 
bomb making and instruction on how to carry out the attack. A senior al-Qaeda leader in 
Pakistan has been found to be the orchestrator of this plot.44 
FBI Director Robert Mueller stated in September 2006 that he saw a rising threat 
from homegrown terrorists. Reflecting on numbers, he said, “We have certainly 
hundreds . . . But if you’re looking at terrorism across the board . . . we have several 
thousand cases.”45 
Although several success stories have risen with the efforts of state and local law 
enforcement, several domestic terrorists have accomplished their goal of causing terror 
on U.S. soil. Recent attacks occurred on August 5, 2012, when Wade Page opened fire on 
                                                 
43 Jessica Zuckerman, “Foiled Anarchist Plot Shows Why All-Threats Approach Is Needed,” The 
Heritage Foundation, May 1, 2012. 
44 James Jay Carafano, Steven Bucci, and Jessica Zuckerman, “Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: 
The Homegrown Threat and the Long War on Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, April 25, 2012, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/fifty-terror-plots-foiled-since-9–11-the-homegrown-
threat-and-the-long-war-on-terrorism. 
45 Thachuk, Bowman, and Richardson, “Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat Within,” 33. 
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the congregation of a Sikh temple in Oak Creek Wisconsin, killing six innocent civilians 
and wounding three others.   Page committed suicide after the attack, but was found to 
have ideological motivation toward the white supremacist movement. On August 15, 
2012, Floyd Corkins shot and wounded a security guard in the lobby of the family 
research council’s Washington, D.C. office. Floyd carried a box of ammunition and a bag 
full of Chick-fil-A sandwiches. According to media reports Corkins stated, “I don’t like 
your politics,” before he began the attack.46 
Then, on August 16, 2012, Brian Smith, Kyle Joekel, and seven others shot and 
wounded an off-duty deputy while working as a security guard at an oil refinery station in 
Louisiana. After the attack two other deputies responded to a nearby trailer park where 
the vehicle associated with the shooting was spotted. The occupants of the trailer 
ambushed the police officers and killed them. The individuals responsible for the 
shootings belonged to the sovereign citizen movement where other members have been 
under investigation for weapon offenses and previous threats to law enforcement officers 
around the country. 47 
Although Domestic Terrorist attacks have caused nowhere near the devastation of 
the attacks on 9/11, Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 claimed 168 lives while injuring 500. It ranks as the 
second deadliest attack on U.S. soil following the attack on the Twin Towers. Many law 
enforcement agencies view domestic terrorism as a prominent concern. Deputy Police 
Chief Michael P. Downing of the Los Angeles Police Department was quoted in the CRS 
report on Domestic terrorism as describing violent Islamists such as Al Qaeda, 
Hezbollah, and Hamas as Los Angeles’s main terrorist threats “along with three other 
terrorist categories: black separatists, white supremacist/sovereign citizen extremists, and 
animal rights terrorists.”48 
                                                 
46 Scott Stewart, “Domestic Terrorism: A Persistent Threat in the United States,” Stratford Global 
Intelligence, August 23, 2012. 
47 Stewart, “Domestic Terrorism.” 
48 Bjelopera, “The Domestic Terrorist Threat,” 38. 
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The CRS study on Domestic Terrorism found that there have been 25 incidents of 
domestic attacks that fall under the definition of Domestic Terrorism. The study also 
found that a large number of these attacks do not use extreme tactics used by the Jihadist 
terrorist such as bombings or airplane attacks, with the exception of the suicide attack by 
Andrew Joseph Stack III. In February 2010, Stack flew his airplane into the IRS building 
in Austin, Texas, killing one other person and injuring many more in an attempt to defy 
his anarchist ideology. 
A study by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell 
School of Public Policy examined post 9/11 cases of Americans or U.S. residents 
convicted or charged with terrorist activity. The study found 192 American civilians and 
U.S. residents had fallen in the category of either convicted or charged with some form of 
Jihadist terrorist activity between 2001 and 2011. The report also found that only four of 
the homegrown jihadist extremist plots developed into a successful attack, resulting in a 
total of seventeen deaths. Included in this number is the Ft. Hood, Texas, shooting by 
Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan who killed thirteen and wounded 29. 
These recent successful and foiled plots of domestic terrorism indicate there is a 
high level of threat facing American today. The National Strategy of Counterterrorism 
concludes despite the successes in our counterterrorism efforts, the U.S. continues to face 
a significant terrorist threat from al-Qa’ida, its affiliates, and its adherents both overseas 
and domestic.49  With these continued threats facing America, we cannot stop enhancing 
our law enforcement capabilities. 
D. WHY LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT? 
After 9/11, local law enforcement and municipalities began to develop their own 
way of combating the growing threat of terrorism. These communities feel their needs are 
far too diverse for the federal government to handle effectively; local forces are far better 
attuned to local sensitivities and requirements.50 What’s more, the federal decision-
                                                 
49 Executive Office of the President, The National Strategy For Counterterrorism, Washington D.C., 
June 2011. 
50 Matt Mayer, “Effective Counterterrorism: State and Local Capabilities Trump Federal Policy,” The 
Heritage Foundation, June 3, 2009. 
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making process has been criticized as being insufficient, inefficient, inept, slow, and 
unduly bureaucratic. Community members trust their local and state law enforcement 
officials, who are essentially part of the community and who have a finer sense of the 
people, time, and place. For all the federal-level planning and discussion, local agencies 
have taken significant steps to expand and redefine their roles and missions in 
counterterrorism. 
The U.S. government has taken a clearly defined and more active role in 
federalizing the homeland security mission, but a number of experts have criticized this 
approach. A report from the Heritage Center for Data Analysis states, “Not only is this 
approach constitutionally incorrect, but states themselves could do the job better.”51  The 
Federal resources are physically too far apart to adopt any type of first response or to 
secure rapid responses. The needs of the different localities are too diverse for the federal 
government to handle, and the decision making process by the hands of the Federal 
Government has been criticized as being inept. The responsibility should be placed where 
the issue can be handled more efficiently and where proper leadership can effectively 
decide what’s best for that area. Community members trust their local and state law 
enforcement members due to the realization that they are essentially part of the 
community. Because they live within that community, local law enforcement officers 
develop gut instincts that give them the sense of what’s wrong. 
Since the disastrous moments of 9/11, the federal government has created over 
260 new and reorganized federal groups, expanded the intelligence efforts throughout the 
country to a budget of over $75 billion, and awarded hundreds of thousands of secret 
clearances to military, civilians, and private contractors, some estimating of over 850,000 
personnel. 52  However, terrorism plots continue to unfold within the United States. In 
2009, Army Psychiatrist Nidal Malik Hasan attacked several of his fellow soldiers at Fort 
Hood killing 13 and injuring 29, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the Underwear 
Bomber) nearly succeeded in his attempt to blow an American jetliner out of the sky in 
                                                 
51 Matt A. Mayer, “Effective Counterterrorism: State and Local Capabilities Trump Federal Policy.”  
Heritage Foundation, June 3, 2009, 1. 
52 Judith Miller, “The Shield We Need: The best defense against terrorism is not in D.C.–it’s the 
NYPD model,” New York Daily News, July 25, 2010. 
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route to Detroit, Michigan. In 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized Pakistani-American 
attempted to detonate a car bomb at rush hour in Times Square, and recently three 
packages detonated in two different Maryland state buildings causing several injuries.53  
The determination of Islamist extremist to bring death and chaos to the American people 
has created and revived a serious debate over the effectiveness of how the U.S. conducts 
the “Homegrown” war on terror and whether these efforts should be restructured. 
Without proper legal definitions of the homegrown terminology and domestic terrorism, 
law enforcement agencies continue to have problems understanding who ultimately is 
responsible.54 
The current job of detecting domestic terrorism falls to the responsibility of the 
FBI and their current establishment of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). Judge 
Posner from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago warns 
the FBI, however, is dominated and overwhelmed by the criminal investigators 
responsible for collecting information that bring criminal organizations and individuals to 
justice. Due to the overwhelming responsibility the FBI has, the organization has been 
unable to transform itself into a pure intelligence gathering agency. 55 
Judge Posner states in Judith Miller’s article, “The Shield We Need,” that “The 
Bureau conceives intelligence as merely an adjunct to arrest and prosecution, and 
measuring success by number of arrests.” 56  He argues the FBI continually “jumps the 
gun” by arresting terrorist suspects as soon as the organization has gathered enough 
evidence to convict them of providing “material support” to terrorists or another lesser 
crime, rather than continuing its investigation until the full scope of a terrorist plot has 
been revealed.57 
                                                 
53 “UPDATE 3-Packages detonate in two Maryland state buildings,” Reuters, January 6, 2011, 
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54 Judith Miller, “On the Front Line in the War on Terrorism,” City Journal, Summer 2007. 
55 Richard A. Posner, “Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis,” The Washington Post, December 21, 2005. 
56 Judith Miller, “On the Front Line.” 
57 Ibid. 
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Posner’s argument provides support for the view that more intelligence collection 
and handling of counterterrorism efforts should be conducted at the local level. However, 
no matter who conducts the job of counterterrorism within the borders of the United 
States, a clear definition must be established that reflect the responsibilities of all the 
members involved. After ten years of the most deadly terrorist attack our nation has 
faced, we still have yet to define how to properly handle this threat.   
The primary question state and local law enforcement need to answer is how they 
can better prepare themselves to become more resilient from a terrorist attack. There is 
one organization that has created a model, which different cities and states can begin to 
follow and adopt to become more resilient in the event of a terrorist attack within their 
municipality. This chapter has defined domestic terrorism as it has been seen during the 
post 9/11 era and has shown a progression of successful and foiled attacks both by 
domestic jihadist and non-jihadist who follow their own ideological agenda and wish to 
cause terror. Finally, this chapter has shown why local and state law enforcement is better 
suited to defend against this rising threat. With the framework laid, this thesis will 
transition into the case study of the NYPD. The second chapter will analyze what the 
leading law enforcement agency in the counterterrorism world has created and begin to 
answer what other municipalities can learn from the NYPD model against fighting the 
domestic terrorism threat and what should be handled at the federal level. 
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III. THE NYPD MODEL: THE GOOD, THE BAD,  
AND THE UGLY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The devastating events of 9/11 forced the NYPD to become the country’s most 
aggressive domestic intelligence agency. Police Commissioner Ray Kelly took over the 
NYPD, hiring David Cohen (a retired CIA official) as the NYPD’s first Intelligence 
Chief. Both Kelly and Cohen knew their organization could not solely rely on the federal 
government to prevent terrorism in New York City. They instilled the mindset of not 
relying on the federal government for help to all of their employees and consistently 
spoke that New York was their city and they had to do whatever means necessary to 
protect it. The NYPD then created the first local law enforcement intelligence and 
counterterrorism division to include undercover CT agents with numerous amounts of 
informants representing different ethnicities. They also hired intelligence analysts and 
created a community mapping effort, a terrorism cyber unit, a small army of linguists, 
and overseas liaison analysts.58 
This chapter analyzes the case study of the NYPD and the model they created 
after 9/11 and begins to emphasize aspects of the model that can be learned and shared 
through different communities and municipalities around the country, which this thesis 
refers to as “the Good.”  This chapter also highlights examples of what the NYPD has 
done that should not be handled by local law enforcement but rather at the federal level 
referred to as “the Bad,” as well as methods that have been heavily criticized and 
scrutinized by the civil right communities which have failed to produce any leads to 
terrorism “the Ugly.” 
B. THE GOOD 
With the NYPD becoming the first local municipality to establish an intelligence 
department, the leadership felt they needed some help in order to get the department up 
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on its feet. Cohen utilized his contacts over at the Central Intelligence Agency to acquire 
Lawrence Sanchez to begin assisting the department’s establishment. Sanchez worked as 
the CIA liaison to the NYPD in order to step up cooperation with law enforcement on 
counterterrorism for nearly a decade. Cohen began interviewing perspective NYPD 
officers and created newly defined jobs within the new department. Once the jobs were 
assigned he began directing their efforts by mentoring and teaching these individuals in 
the art of gathering information.59 
Utilizing the available resources within the NYPD and the vast ethnicity within 
the department, they began to dispatch officers to Pakistani neighborhoods and instructed 
those officers to increase the frequency of minor traffic stops either for speeding, broken 
tail lights, or running stop signs. These traffic stops gave the police an opportunity to 
search for warrants that were outstanding or unusual behavior. If this was noticed and an 
arrest was made, the department could then utilize this as leverage to entice that 
individual to become an informant. Informants are the essential backbone of any 
intelligence operation. With help from the CIA, the NYPD understood the necessity of 
this concept and capitalized on the efforts.60 
Undercover agents are out in the field all over the country performing similar 
mission as the NYPD, except they are not experiencing the success that the NYPD has. 
This is based on the Intelligence analyst’s ability to read through the lines of information 
and see things a normal police officer would not see. With the establishment of the 
NYPD’s intelligence division, Cohen knew coming from the intelligence field in the CIA, 
without people to translate the skills of the officer’s information out in the field, they 
could simply miss something huge. He knew he needed people who were smart and had a 
grasp of the cultural understanding of the populace within his jurisdiction and the 
suspects he was meant to be pursuing.61 
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The importance of having intelligence analysts is crucial to the intelligence 
process. One intelligence detective from the NYPD’s intelligence division stated to a 
New York Times reporter that, “When we first started we didn’t even know they prayed 
on Fridays.”62  Analysts are able to inform detectives and enhance their credibility when 
dealing with potential sources out in the field. They are able to dissect the information 
and give knowledge to the officers out in the field in order to improve their duties as 
undercover agents or those investigating a lead. 
This model of the intelligence process proved to be extremely beneficial in the 
apprehension of Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to blow up Times Square using a Vehicle 
Born Bomb. Within an hour of the discovery of the car, the analytical team began 
assessing the situation and brainstorming leads to be pursued, while detectives out in 
Times Square looked for clues and evidence. The analytical team began pondering where 
the material for the bomb may have been attained and what the sticker on the timing 
device meant.63 
The team created an eight-page report for Cohen within 24 hours, which stated the 
“Evolving and dynamic terrorist group. Tehrik-e-Taliban of Pakistan (T.T.P.) was 
probably behind the failed attack.”64 The Federal Government and later Shahzad himself 
also confirmed this information during the June 21, 2010 guilty plea in federal court.65 
Coming from an Intelligence background, Cohen knew the exact caliber an 
individual needed for a specific job. He understood the need for productive intelligence 
analysts. Therefore, he hired those of the highest and smartest skill sets coming from Ivy 
League schools such as Harvard, Columbia and Yale. He ensured he had a wide range of 
sophistication in international academia that covered the scope of potential extremist 
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living in his jurisdiction. Living in New York City entails a large range of nationalities, 
which is why his analytical specialists speak languages that ranged from Urdu, Farsi, 
Russian, Arabic, and Hebrew and study areas which included, South Asia, Somalia, 
Yemen, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Iran, and the study of Homegrown Terrorist Groups.66 
The analysts and detective relationships have proven to be effective and 
conducive relationship. The relationship between the two entities is said to be closer than 
the relationships seen within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, according to statements 
by Mr. Rascoff, who at the time ran the analytical Unit. He claimed that the FBI’s 
detectives were just as educated as the analysts they worked with, saying they do the 
same job except one has a gun and kicks down doors and the other sits behind a desk. He 
states in the Police Department there is an, “Educational, experimental but not intellectual 
gulf that can paradoxically bring the sides together.”67 
The reliance on having analysts at the call for intelligence detectives is a crucial 
and widely successful component. According to the New York Times, one detective 
states, “Whenever I have problems, I call my analysts,” and  “They’re from a different 
world… They’re educated I’m not. My education is locking up bad guys.”68 
Analysts have the knowledge to distinguish an individual’s ethnicity simple by 
knowing the cultural aspects of the person either by the facial features and beards to the 
length and style of the clothing. This can prove immensely valuable to a detective or 
officer patrolling the streets. Without that specific knowledge, a person can easily be 
mistaken for a different ethnicity and potentially disrupt an operation. 
These analysts previously worked in high visible jobs such as the United Nations, 
State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the New American Foundation. 
Mr. Silber, who was hired to run the team in 2008, left the financial world of Carson 
Group and Evolution Capital because 9/11 made him want “to get into the fight.”69 He 
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later attended Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs and studied the 
regulation of terrorist money transitioning from corporate finance to terrorist finance. 
The Cyber teams within the Intelligence division have a unique and essential 
element to the intelligence department and counterterrorism teams within the NYPD. 
Specifically, during the investigation of the “Times Square car bomb,” cyber teams were 
able to determine that a You Tube account had been set up 24 hours before the attack had 
occurred, and they were able to analyze the video. They identified the leader of the group 
(T.T.P.) stating they had penetrated the United States. They also have the ability to search 
the Internet using certain phrases then filtering the results through trained eyes to notice 
anything obscure.70 
C. THE BAD 
The NYPD learned after 9/11 that terrorist activity does not always originate in 
city where the attack occurs. Planning for the attack may occur overseas or even in a 
different state. In response the department decided to extend intelligence collection and 
mapping techniques beyond the scope of New York City. Cohen established an 
undercover squad called the Special Services Unit (SSU) that operates in states such as 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. These officers cannot make 
any arrests within that jurisdiction and if something goes wrong, those officers can be 
held personally liable. The NYPD feels the risk is worth it. This was proven a success 
during the undercover operation in New Jersey that ultimately led to the arrest and 
conviction of Mohamed Mahmoud Alessa and Carlos Eduardo Almonte for attempting to 
fly to Somalia to join the terrorist group al-Shabab in order to learn and join the fight to 
kill Americans.71 
In 2010, the SSU was conducting surveillance operation out of a hotel in Newark 
New Jersey. These undercover officers and informants eavesdropped in Muslim cafés and 
monitored sermons, even when there was no evidence of a crime. The result was that 
many innocent business owners, students, and others were cataloged in police files. The 
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hotel management was extremely suspicions of the activity in the rooms where the 
undercover officers were staying. They called the Newark police station and informed 
them of the concerns coming from the rooms. When the Newark Police Department 
knocked on the door, they found several NYPD officers with surveillance equipment, 
computers, and other monitoring devices.72  
The NYPD asserted that the operations were lawful and necessary to keep the city 
safe from the threat of a terrorist attack. New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg says the 
“NYPD can gather intelligence anywhere in the country it wants and is not required to 
tell local authorities.”73 NYPD lawyers say jurisdictional lines do not bind them because 
they are just collecting intelligence, not making arrests or otherwise acting as police.74 
The NYPD was later found not to have violated any New Jersey laws when they 
conducted surveillance of Muslim businesses, mosques and student groups. The N.J. 
Attorney General Jeffrey Chiesa and his office conducted a three month long 
investigation that concluded the NYPD’s operations violated no state laws, either civil or 
criminal. The New Jersey Muslims, according to an article published by the Associated 
Press, have no state recourse to stop the New York Police Department from infiltrating 
student groups, videotaping mosque-goers, or collecting their license plate numbers as 
they pray. They claim they will consider all legal options, including renewed appeals for 
action by the U.S. Justice Department. A federal civil rights lawsuit will be considered.75 
Although the NYPD was found to have not violated any New Jersey Laws, they lost 
significant respect from the FBI, New Jersey officials, and Muslim activists. 
Counterterrorism efforts rely significantly on sharing of information and communication 
among such a broad facet of law enforcement entities. The lessons learned from the 9/11-
commission report state there must be stronger coordination between the different entities 
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including the FBI and CIA. This does not mean the NYPD can conduct counterterrorism 
efforts in secret without any cross coordination. 
There are several reasons why the NYPD surveillance activity in New Jersey was 
wrong. First, not only does it raise a lot of question of the civil liberties across America, it 
distinctly violates the civil liberties of the Muslim businesses they were spying on. 
Second, in doing this operation in secrecy without any cross coordination, it significantly 
makes it harder for other organization to do their job. Instead of working together to 
figure out if there is a legitimate threat from the organizations that were being spied on, 
now the FBI and the New Jersey law enforcement personnel have to stop what they are 
doing in order to figure out why the NYPD is operating out of their jurisdiction and 
whether it is legal. Overall, this makes everyone’s job more difficult. 
The FBI has weighed in critically on the New Jersey Surveillance controversy, 
where NYPD officers were found conducting surveillance operations on Muslims inside 
the state without notifying New Jersey officials. New Jersey’s FBI chief, Michael Ward, 
also has been extremely critical of the NYPD for not conducting the operations within the 
umbrella of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), to which the NYPD belongs. He said, 
“The actions undermined the bureau’s own efforts by sowing distrust of authorities 
among Muslims and weakened national security.”76 The JTTF is an organization with 
partnerships among the different law enforcement agencies throughout the country that 
are charged with taking action against and preventing a terrorist activity. The FBI leads 
the task force with participation from local municipalities and other components that fall 
under the Department of Homeland Security including the Coast Guard, Customs, and 
Border Control.77 
Since the NYPD was being allowed to conduct primarily intelligence surveillance 
in other municipalities and states throughout the country, the NYPD decided to extend 
their modes of surveillance and widen their intelligence capabilities. Cohen decided to 
establish the Intelligence Division’s International Liaison Program (ILP) that would 




office NYPD officers in eleven foreign capitals. The ILP’s main mission would be to 
gather information and gain perspectives around the world. They would act as the eyes 
and years of the NYPD to access international intelligence.78 
The ILP has been seen as a rogue intelligence division with no oversight and an 
outrageous amount of funding. While NYPD officers are stationed in the 11 foreign 
capitals, they work for no one but the NYPD. They operate outside the authority of top 
U.S. officials abroad including American ambassadors and CIA station chiefs, who 
operate as the head of U.S. intelligence in foreign countries. The NYPD officers are not 
official members of the country team, they do not have the top-secret clearances and 
equipment to receive or send classified information. The NYPD officers travel on tourist 
passports. They live in hotels or apartments. Their out of channel status makes them 
virtually useless to other intelligence or police agencies, both U.S. and foreign. The 
argument is being made that the duties undertaken by the NYPD’s ILP fall beyond the 
responsibilities of local law enforcement and their presence becomes more of a hindrance 
than any type of assistance. The NYPD, in this case, continues to make the job of law 
enforcement personnel responsible for this type of operation much more difficult. Not 
only are the NYPD personnel completely operating out of their jurisdiction, but also they 
cannot provide any useful assistance. Their hindrance on the personnel attempting to do 
their job does more harm than good.79 
Funding for the ILP has also started a series of debates. The NYPD refuses to 
disclose how much if any of the intelligence and counterterrorism budget of $178 million 
goes into the funding of the ILP. The New York City Council members, who are 
ultimately responsible for police oversight, know very little about the ILP, especially its 
budget. During an interview with the Washington Post, Peter Vallone Jr., a member of 
the council, states, it is fair he does not know much, “But my main concern is their use of 
taxpayer funds here in NYC.”80  Leonard Levitt claims, “There appears to be no 
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monitoring of the NYPD, a municipal agency that in its anti-terrorism measures, has 
become a mini-CIA,” and Thomas Fuentes, who headed the FBI’s International 
Operations from 2004 until 2008 calls the ILP, “A complete waste of money… But it 
looks great, looks really terrific.”81 
According to the Washington Post interview with Thomas Fuentes, moments after 
the 2005 London subway bombings, “Several New York police officers ran into the 
tunnel and showed their badges as if they had official approval to participate in the 
investigation, and they didn’t.”82  The cops went back out of the tunnel, called the offices 
of the NYPD intelligence division. Mayor Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Ray 
Kelly promptly held a press conference describing the attack in London including what 
had gone on in the subway and how they’re going to protect our subway and populace 
from a similar attack if the threat were exposed.83 
Although this may look good for the NYPD and the people of NYC, this is 
ultimately bad for everyone else. An investigation takes time and involves detailed 
analyses. Evidence must be collected and reports must be submitted and reviewed before 
releasing to the press. These individuals had no need to be at this crime scene 3,500 miles 
from home. The release of this information back to their offices, which was immediately 
released to the public by the mayor, only caused more confusion and headaches for the 
individuals legitimately responsible for collecting evidence and solving the crime. The 
NYPD ultimately did more harm than good stepping on the toes of the individuals trying 
to perform their assigned duties. The U.S. has personnel assigned to accomplish these 
goals of analyses during overseas terrorist events. The NYPD is not and should not be 
considered one of those personnel. 
The NYPD has also been criticized for acting alone in the absence of their FBI 
counterparts. In November 2011, Jose Pimentel, also known as Muhammad Yusuf, was 
in the midst of completing a powerful pipe bomb project that was designed to kill 
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American troops, particularly those coming home from Iraq and Afghanistan. The NYPD 
completed the raid without the help of the FBI, stating they could not wait for the bureau 
to finish their assessment. The NYPD officials claimed that the FBI initially stated, 
“Pimentel didn’t have the predisposition or the ability to do anything on his own.”84 
Instead of law enforcement an agency acting independently, the argument has 
been made for a greater cross coordination between all the agencies both federal and 
state. Since 9/11, there have been many initiatives to assist state and local law 
enforcement to become more involved and better informed of what is happening in their 
community. One of the biggest projects in this area is the establishment of state and local 
intelligence fusion centers. The Global Intelligence Working Group began seeing the 
quality of work accomplished by fusion centers and local agencies and thus created a 
series of recommendations and practices for law enforcement. These practices gave law 
enforcement information sharing relationships with the private sector and public safety 
issues revolving around homeland security and defense. 
This viewpoint supports the argument for a greater coordination effort between 
federal and state enforcement and suggests intelligence collection and counterterrorism 
efforts should be equally employed. The NYPD continues to decline the offer of joining 
the fusion center  team in order to continue operating under the relaxed guidelines. 85  
This is another example of New York City’s “go it alone” attitude. The refusal to join the 
national fusion network not only affect the NYPD for acquiring valuable Intelligence and 
analyses from a national perspective, but also it affects agencies and other states 
nationally from understanding what is occurring in New York. According to the 
recommendations by Dr. James E. Steiner, the State of New York should “Work with 
NYPD intelligence (staffed at roughly 500 officers) in its role as the primary developer of 
CT intelligence regarding New York City. Expand on NYC finished intelligence products 
to address implications for the entire state.” What this mission should state is expand on 
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the New York City finished products for the entire nation in a cross collaborative effort to 
share intelligence.86  Until counterterrorism effort is a mutually shared concept between 
federal, state, and local entities, someone will always be in the dark and unaware of what 
may actually be occurring in their jurisdiction. 
D. THE UGLY 
The NYPD is no stranger to controversy, especially when it comes to the issue of 
civil liberties.   During the 1950s and the 1960s, protest and civil disturbance came along 
with increasing crime on the streets of the city. The tensions of race riots were first seen 
in Harlem, according to the Digital Library of Civil Rights. An estimated eight thousand 
residents of Harlem launched a large-scale riot in the year 1964 in response to the 
shooting of a fifteen-year-old boy by the NYPD. The destruction of this riot included 
fires, breaking windows, and looting of local businesses.87 
As part of its efforts to get ahead of the unrest and criminality, the NYPD decided 
to monitor students, civil rights groups, and suspected Communist sympathizers. The 
spying on these different organizations brought several arrests, including the 
apprehension of 21 members of the Black Panther Party, allegedly for a conspiracy to 
blow up several police stations and department stores. At trial, the members were all 
acquitted after less than two hours of jury deliberation. Worse, the proceedings revealed 
several illegal actions by the NYPD, including the surveillance of not just the Black 
Panthers but civic organizations, civil-rights groups, education reformers, and religious 
associations. The NYPD also kept intelligence files on these groups and their members, 
whether or not they engaged in illegal acts.88 
As a consequence of this trial, in 1971, Barbara Handschu was a lead plaintiff in a 
class action suit in New York District Court, Handschu vs. Special Services Division (605 
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F.Supp. 1384, affirmed 787 F.2d 828). Handschu was a New York attorney who had 
taken to defending radical clients such as the Black Panthers and the Chicago Seven after 
her participation in a housing-rights demonstration in 1969. She certified the class of 
plaintiffs, which included Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, and brought the suit on First 
Amendment grounds:  The NYPD surveillance, undercover, and intelligence activities 
violated the people’s right to associate and protest, according to the suit, not least because 
they did not target criminals or even potential criminals. And lastly, the Police 
Department was prohibited from investigating and conducting surveillance operations on 
political and religious groups unless there was “specific information” that linked the 
group to a crime that had been committed or was about to be committed.89 
The NYPD plaintiffs and the Handschu team reached a settlement to establish 
surveillance rules and oversight by a three-panel member. The Handschu Guidelines 
prohibited the NYPD from starting a new surveillance file based on the religion or 
political nature of a person or group. The guidelines also banned NYPD detectives and 
officers from collecting and writing notes on political and religious groups and their 
activities. 90 
In the wake of 9/11, New York law enforcement, which had chafed under the 
Handschu Guidelines, sought relief from the restrictions; NYPD Deputy Intelligence 
Commissioner David Cohen asked a federal judge, the same Judge Charles S. Haight 
who handed down the original 1985 decision, to remove or at least significantly loosen 
these guidelines. Cohen argued that “The FBI was changing its rules to respond to 9/11, 
the NYPD must do so, too.” 91   After 9/11, the Patriot Act was established that endowed 
many provisions of law enforcement agencies, specifically the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation with a greater amount of freedom in surveillance and investigation. Special 
intelligence courts authorized the collection of data from roving wiretaps, relaxed rules 
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for gaining access to electronic communications and student records by subpoena, and 
enlarged the availability of information from grand jury investigations by law 
enforcement authorities. According to Manas Mohapatra, “The roving wiretaps enlarged 
the availability of information from grand jury investigations, and the relaxed rules for 
gaining electronic communications and student records allowed the eavesdropping and 
so-called ‘sneak and peek’ searches of private governmental premises.”92 
In the game of fighting against a terrorism plot, waiting for an indication of a 
crime may be too late, the argument ran. Law enforcement needed more investigative 
latitude. Reluctantly, but ultimately swayed by the urgency of the department’s tasks, 
Judge Haight relaxed the Handschu Guidelines in 2003.93 The new set of rules, which 
became known as the Modified Handschu Guidelines, did away with the three-member 
panel, which conducted the oversight on the NYPD’s surveillance activities. The 
modified guidelines also gave Cohen the ability to act alone and authorized investigations 
for a year at a time. He was also authorized to conduct undercover operations for four 
months at a time no matter what the religious affiliation of the member or group belonged 
to. The “specific information” rule, which was required in acting on a future crime about 
to be committed, was then revised to say, “Only that facts should ‘reasonably indicate’ a 
future crime.”94  Handschu tried vainly to have her name disassociated from what 
remained of the guidelines.95 
With a new and roomier set of regulations to fight the battle against terrorism, 
Cohen and Police Commissioner Ray Kelly decided to expand their organization. Cohen 
began creating secret squads to perform surveillance operations in Muslim neighborhoods 
and assigned undercover officers to patrol specific zones, established by Cohen, to look 
for potential suspicious activity. Cohen began using the benefits of a multinational police 
force to his advantage. He began placing undercover officers in ethnic communities and 
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instructed those officers to blend in with daily life.  Palestinian-American officers were 
placed in Palestinian neighborhoods and Pakistani-American officers were placed in 
Pakistani neighborhoods. These officers frequently visited popular establishments, 
observing and looking for suspicious activity. If these officers found an area that was 
acting out of the normal spectrum of the confines of their establishment, such has a 
beauty salon selling chemicals or an Internet café with computers that have a browsing 
history of radical websites, those establishments would be deemed as a Hot Spot. Cohen 
referred to this operation as “raking the coals for Hot Spots.”96 
This tactic was believed to have led authorities to the arrest and conviction of 
Shahawar Matin Siraj, who was charged and convicted of planning an attack on New 
York’s subways. It has also aroused new controversy—including some from old players. 
Both Barbara Handschu and Judge Haight have taken their objections to the new 
measures to the public. Handschu turned up at protests against the war in Iraq in 2005 
and has spoken frequently to the press about the deterioration of civil liberties amid 
unnecessarily permissive police policy. That same year, Judge Haight issued a 51-page 
order, admonishing the NYPD to take a lighter touch with the First Amendment or risk 
contempt charges, even under the modified Handschu Guidelines.97 
After six years of operating under the Modified Handschu Guidelines, The NYPD 
again found itself back in Federal Court. This time with no evidence that lead to any 
convictions or leads. During a deposition in June 28, 2012, The Assistant Chief Thomas 
Galati testified that none of the dialogues overheard during the spying campaign led to a 
case. According to the Associated Press, Galati testified, “Related to Demographics, that 
information that has come in has not commenced an investigation.”98  In his testimony, 
Galati referred to a tip collected from the Demographic Unit that ultimately led to a case 
against a bookstore clerk who planned to bomb the Herald Square subway, that there was 
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no evidence from the demographic team leading to the arrest. The attorney who filed the 
Handschu case and questioned Galati during the deposition, Jethro Eisentein, claims he 
plans on returning to court soon and demanding the Demographic Unit be shut down. 
Members of Congress are beginning to question the tactics of the NYPD, asking the 
Justice Department to investigate the NYPD. However, John Brennan, who is President 
Obama’s lead Counterterrorism adviser, says confidently, “The NYPD’s activities are 
lawful and have kept the city safe.”99 
E. CONCLUSION 
Although this chapter may seem to favor the criticism toward the NYPD model, it 
is important to note that the NYPD has had a long history of civil liberty disturbances and 
unfortunately fell victim to the country’s biggest tragedy since Pearl Harbor. Between the 
history of spying on their own civilians and the need to prevent the city from another 
attack, one can explain why this organization went to the extremes that they did. 
However, what is also important to note here is that the NYPD started a new revolution 
in law enforcement. They created the idea of counterterrorism and intelligence divisions 
within a local law enforcement organization that can effectively prevent or foil any 
attempts by domestic terrorists that want to instill fear and terror among the population. 
The only question now is how other municipalities can use this model without the 
extremes and criticism that comes with the NYPD, or the question of this thesis, what 
lessons does the New York Police Department model offer for other police municipalities 
and communities around the United States in fighting against the domestic terrorism 
threat, and what should be handled at the federal level? 
Chapter IV briefly describes the different case studies from a few municipalities 
that have begun to develop their own counterterrorism model and shows whether or not 
these tactics have been effective. This next chapter examines these municipalities and 
describes what local law enforcement agencies outside the NYPD have accomplished. 
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IV. COUNTERTERRORISM IN OTHER COMMUNITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After the NYPD created one of the most aggressive domestic intelligence 
agencies in the country, several large municipalities felt the need to do the same.  Even 
though no other city in the U.S. experienced the loss that New York City suffered, every 
mayor and police commissioner around the country wanted to do whatever was necessary 
in order to prevent this type of attack from occurring within their jurisdiction.  Cities such 
as Los Angeles and Chicago have created counterterrorism divisions similar to the NYPD 
model and have had varied results in terms of foiled attacks and approval from the public.   
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was the first municipality to begin 
following the model of the NYPD after 9/11.  The Boston Police Department (BPD) 
shows a different perspective from the NYPD model on how they conduct 
counterterrorism tactics.  Finally, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) recently 
established its own version of the NYPD model ten years after the NYPD introduced 
their counterterrorism model.  This chapter analyzes the LAPD, the BPD, and the CPD, 
and briefly mentions a few smaller municipalities and their efforts against terrorism.  This 
chapter also distinguishes which aspects of these police department’s efforts in 
preventing terrorism have proved beneficial or have had a negative impact against the 
mission of counterterrorism. 
B. THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT  
Los Angeles has never suffered a terrorist attack by the al-Qaeda terrorist 
organization or any of their followers.  However, the city has been linked to several plots 







after 9/11 and the new policies set forth by the Patriot Act, the LAPD felt the need to 
institute new reforms similar to those of the NYPD, including increased surveillance and 
confidential informants.100 
The LAPD knew not every Muslim American community within their 
municipality was linked to the radicalization of terrorism, but felt they did not have an 
effective counter-radicalization program.  Following the model of the NYPD mapping 
process, the LAPD began to develop a unique version called the “Muslim Mapping” 
project.  This project was developed by law enforcement officials to give the local police 
a better sense of the communities under their jurisdiction and to promote moderate voices 
within the Muslim Community in order to isolate extremists and create a shared sense of 
threat.101 
The entire organization was supportive of the project, including the mayor, who 
states, “The efforts of the project were not targeting or racial profiling, but attempting to 
understand the communities.”102  LAPD Police Chief William J. Bratton defended the 
project by stating, “This is not targeting… It is an effort to understand communities.”103 
This project was supported by the entire LAPD organization.  They felt this program 
would enable the LAPD to pinpoint where violent extremism starts and potentially stop 
an attack from occurring. 
The project was soon discontinued, however, after an outcry from the Muslim 
community and civil liberties groups within the area.  These organizations claimed the 
project unfairly singled out Muslims as the top concern for the LAPD, which resulted in 
unfair police surveillance and spying. The Muslim Public Affairs Council stated, “We 
were very disturbed and concerned about the ramifications of the plan and having our 
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privacy invaded."104  The groups charged that if the project’s goal was an outreach 
program to understand and better acquaint with the community, then it failed miserably. 
105  
The Muslim Mapping project was a huge mistake committed by the LAPD.  In an 
attempt to replicate the mapping process of the NYPD, the LAPD neglected to realize 
that Muslims are not the only ethnicity committing acts or attempting to commit acts of 
terrorism.  However, singling out one particular ethnicity, as in this case the Muslim 
community, is a severe act of racial profiling.  As we have discussed already in chapter 3, 
this strategy is considered an “Ugly” aspect of the NYPD methods of counterterrorism 
and should not be replicated.  By committing acts of racial profiling at this magnitude, 
the LAPD began to lose the faith and cooperation of that entire community, which is an 
essential aspect of counterterrorism. 
After the failure of the mapping project, Muslim community leaders and LAPD 
officials attempted to rethink a counter-radicalization strategy.  LAPD Deputy Chief 
Michael Downing claimed dropping the program would open the dialogue between 
Muslim Americans and the LAPD and possibly lead to a new, more effective 
counterterrorism strategy.106  However, coordination between the two significantly 
decreased due to the “loss of confidence” exhibited from both sides. The Muslim leaders 
felt the LAPD were only looking to profile and map their communities no matter what 
strategy was developed and the LAPD felt the Muslim leaders had effectively lost any 
type of influence they had.  The LAPD felt they could no longer count on the Muslim 
leaders to represent their views to the public.107 
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The LAPD officers claimed the Muslim leaders failed to understand the idea of 
what the LAPD was trying to accomplish when in reality, the police department failed to 
understand how to effectively and legitimately conduct counterterrorism.  By conducting 
racial profiling of the Muslim community, the LAPD lost the ability to effectively work 
in an intelligence environment within the community.  Instead of creating excuses for 
why the program did not work, the department should have developed ways to reestablish 
their relationship with the public. 
The LAPD did not have full situational awareness throughout their communities, 
which forced the organization to pursue other modes of intelligence collection.  After 
failing to develop a coordinated strategy with the Muslim Community, they instead 
focused on a program that collects information continuously no matter what ethnicity or 
race. The LAPD decided to incorporate the Suspicious Activities Reporting program 
(SAR) into their primary methods of collecting intelligence.  The purpose of this program 
was to allow trained analysts to identify different patterns in the behavior of individuals 
that may be planning or preparing for a terrorist attack. The information is tracked, 
coded, and recorded through a system that observes suspicious activity include using 
binoculars or cameras, taking measurements, taking pictures or videos footage of selected 
areas and buildings, drawing or taking notes, pursuing training in a suspicious field, and 
exposing extremist views.108 
The LAPD claims this system avoids racial profiling and focuses primarily on an 
individual’s behavior.  Critics of the system argue the process “Opens the door to racial 
profiling ... and exposes law-abiding people to government prying into their private 
affairs without just cause.”109  They also say the process, which identifies the suspect 
activities, becomes incredibly broad and that the reporting of these offenses will create 
numerous amounts of useless data.  They claim this will tie down police resources 
attempting to monitor and analyze all the useless information.110 
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Although the SAR program is a step in the right direction in comparison to the 
Muslim Mapping Project, it still is not the permanent solution to the problem, nor is it the 
best intelligence collection asset for counterterrorism models.  The SAR program can 
create vast amounts of information to analyze.  The Congressional Research Service 
refers to this information as “dots.”111 Trying to connect the dots and make sense of the 
information coming in through the system can be time consuming and may force the 
individual conducting the analyses to focus his or her attention on matters that are not 
important instead of information that could be significant. The CRS report refers to 
numerous amounts of “pipe clogging” including a huge amount of information gathering 
without any focus.112 
The GAO found that the use of SAR systems in intelligence fusion centers created 
“Redundancies of information that made it difficult to discern what was relevant. As a 
result, end users were overwhelmed with duplicative information from multiple 
sources.”113  The LAPD use of the SAR program requires constant monitoring and 
analysis by trained intelligence experts to correctly decipher the information coming in.  
Therefore, the LAPD needed to develop a system or network that could accomplish this 
task, which is why the organization joined national initiative of intelligence sharing.  
Another effort in addition to the implementation of the SAR initiative was the 
national sharing of intelligence that was beginning to take effect throughout the nation.  
In July 2006, the Los Angeles Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) was opened.  The 
LAPD, along with their regional partners the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department and the 
FBI Los Angeles office, smartly decided to develop a counterterrorism and infrastructure 
protection center to cover the seven counties in the Los Angeles and southern California 
area.114 
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This establishment brought the FBI’s Field Intelligence Group (FIG), LAPD’s 
Major Crimes Division, and the Sheriff Department’s Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) 
group together under one roof.  The mission of the JRIC is primarily intelligence 
collection, fusion, and analysis, with an emphasis on terrorist threat intelligence.  Using 
this information they were tasked to provide “Timely, regionally focused, and actionable 
information to consumers and producing assessments; and identifying trends, patterns 
and terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures; and sponsoring training 
opportunities.”115 While producing daily and weekly reporting that adequately deciphers 
the intelligence that comes in on a daily basis, the LAPD could focus on the day-to-day 
counterterrorism efforts on the ground. 
Along with the active JRIC, the LAPD’s Counter-Terrorism and Special 
Operations Bureau (CTSOB), which is comprised of Major Crimes Division (ATD) and 
Emergency Services Division (ESD), has taken on the mission of counterterrorism and 
intelligence efforts within the city of Los Angeles. The bureau’s mission is to prevent 
terrorism by effectively sharing information aimed at disrupting terrorist's operational 
capability and addressing the underlying causes associated with the motivational 
component. The CTSOB is also responsible for pursuing terrorists and those criminal 
enterprises that support them.  Ultimately the CTSOB is now responsible for planning, 
response, and intelligence under the mission of counterterrorism.  Between the CTSOB 
and the JRIC, the LAPD has become a formidable force in the battle of 
counterterrorism.116  
C. THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
As major metropolitan areas around the country began to strategize how they 
were going to incorporate and tackle the counterterrorism mission, The Boston Police 
Department (BPD) incorporated a three-step strategy that began to tap into pre-existing  
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infrastructures and networks.  The department began by first combining its pre-existing 
research and evaluation department and intelligence unit into one program called the 
Tactical Intelligence Center (TIC). 
The second step of the strategy was the development of a fusion center, called the 
Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC).  After 9/11, the DHS created grant 
programs to assist states and federal law enforcement agencies in their fight against 
terrorism.   Once the Homeland Security Grant Program created the Urban Areas Security 
Initiative (UASI), the BPD used the funds from the grant program to create the 
department’s Fusion Center in 2005.  The UASI was established to support selected high-
threat, high-density urban areas in order to address multi-discipline planning, 
organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs in order to build and sustain 
capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from threats or acts of 
terrorism.117 The BRIC allowed the integration of intelligence capabilities within the 
Boston area, along with the entire state of Massachusetts, and all of the entities including 
the federal law enforcement partners.  The development represented a strategic overhaul 
of the department’s traditional intelligence operations by embedding civilian crime 
analysts with intelligence investigators to jointly identify, analyze, and disseminate 
patterns and other relevant data. This allowed the department to respond to emerging 
crime trends more quickly, by comparing high-impact criminal activities occurring in 
different locations and involving different people.118  
The third step of the strategy included adding the counterterrorism mission to 
units within the BPD.  Other relevant units within the BPD that were given 
counterterrorism responsibilities include the Police Operations Division, the Bureau of 
Field Service, and specialized response units, which incorporated special operations, 
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hazmat, commercial vehicle enforcement, harbor patrol, and bomb squad.119  Instead of 
creating a separate counter terrorism division similar to the NYPD and LAPD, the BPD 
fused the responsibility throughout many already existing divisions and outside entities. 
The strategy of merging units into a TIC, creating a fusion center, and fusing the 
responsibility through already existing divisions has several advantages and 
disadvantages.  The first advantage for this strategy is that the collection and analysis of 
intelligence improved significantly compared to the system they had.  A RAND study on 
Law Enforcement’s Long Term Effects on Counterterrorism found that some of the 
different divisions within the BPD, for example, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking 
Areas (HIDTA) network, worked well to build the local intelligence functions needed in 
the counterterrorism environment.  Due to the strong relationship built through the shared 
counterterrorism mission, the BPD sent terrorism liaison officers to each precinct office. 
These officers served as a liaison between the officer in the field and the counterterrorism 
unit, and were responsible for tracking and reporting information that may relate to 
counterterrorism.120 
The second advantage to this strategy focuses on the expansion of the community 
networks. With several divisions within the BPD working to accomplish similar 
missions, a large community network was introduced.  A concept called “public trust 
policing” was created, providing a way for the department to reach out to the community 
and build relationships with specific groups.  This concept can also be referred to as 
community policing.  The goal of this strategy was to build trust between the department 
and the community to improve information exchange in the future.121 
Another advantage revolves around the funding needed to facilitate this mission.  
Since the BPD did not need to create an entirely new division or hire new personnel, the 
incorporation of already existing infrastructures needed very little budget requirements.  
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Any extra funding the BPD received from outside grants was utilized to enhance the 
fusion center located in the metropolitan area.122 
The final advantage of this strategy is the involvement in the national sharing of 
intelligence initiative. An organization that has departments coordinating multiple goals 
and responsibilities may be forced to prioritize and focus on the most detrimental and 
important aspects.  As small counterterrorism threads of intelligence compete for 
attention with other priorities in the organization, information sharing specific to terrorist 
threats may fall behind or possibly get thrown out.  Fusion centers around the nation have 
helped to centralize and formalize information sharing between different Law 
Enforcement Agencies (LEA) and other participants. These centers allowed these LEAs 
to become connected to the federal intelligence community. With the BPD developing 
their regional intelligence center, they were able to take advantage of the formalized 
information exchange.  This assisted the knowledge process and relied less on personal 
relationships and contacts, which is especially important since the BPD officers often 
rotated out of counterterrorism positions into new roles or to focus on other missions at 
hand.123  It also gives different police leadership greater control over information that 
might point the way to more serious threats. For instance, through the information 
exchange, the police in Boston can alert their counterparts in Newark to a potential threat 
without having to wait for the information to filter through the federal government.124 
There are, however, several disadvantages to the BPD strategy.  First, it relies on 
technology to organize shared information.  The BPD relies strongly on the technology of 
their fusion center in order to participate without dedicating full-time personnel.  
Personnel work at the BRIC for a short period and often have other responsibilities rather 
then devoting their time fully at the fusion center.  Personnel co-located within the fusion  
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centers create accountability by working face-to-face with other agencies.  Not having 
that physical relationship may reduce the accountability if solely operated in a part-time 
environment. 125  
Second, there is a strong possibility information can be over looked or lost over 
the Internet and through conference calls through informal sharing of information.   
Intelligence analysis is a very dynamic process that requires updated, current exchange, 
and the synthesis of information, which may be lost in virtual environments as well as 
environments with too much responsibility.  If personnel from each participating agency 
are not fully involved in the analysis process, which may be more likely in virtual 
environments because of less face-to-face accountability, then some of the dynamic 
analysis may be lost.126 
A concern expressed in the RAND study is how the sharing of information 
through a system similar to the BPD may become an information dump rather than fusing 
the information and making sense of the intelligence that gets compiled. 127 Having 
networks that are simply a point for sharing information and pushing to other localities 
rather than a true fusion process that gathers and analyzes the threat of information can be 
counterproductive to the mission. 
The last disadvantage associated with the BPD model of counterterrorism is that it 
requires a great deal of knowledge and experience on the part of personnel involved.  The 
BPD involved giving added responsibility to personnel but did not incorporate the needed 
training.  Most of the BPD officers given the responsibility were mid-career officers who 
were highly motivated to get into this area, and often were self-selected.  Those involved 
in the counterterrorism and intelligence process not only have to learn and become 
experts in WMD preparedness and response to CBRNE, as well as major Homeland 
Security initiatives that may impact their jurisdiction, but also learn and understand 
techniques for collecting raw and open source intelligence, conducting open source 
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research, evaluate sources, and understand the fusion center’s detailed guidelines.  The 
information and responsibility needed for a counterterrorism specialist would be very 
difficult to follow and understand if an officer was thrown into the position without any 
training or experience.128 
A counterterrorism commander commented in a recent study that police officers 
did not necessarily make the best analysts. 129  Departments like the BPD utilize the best 
investigators throughout different divisions, for instance the narcotics units, and attempt 
to turn them into intelligence analysts.  Counterterrorism analysts require a unique set of 
expertise and mentality developed through education and training unique to their field.  It 
is noted in this study that typical law enforcement officers are not trained for this duty 
and that there is no specialized career track for officers who are placed in this specialized 
area.  Although law enforcement personnel are uniquely positioned to understand the 
intelligence needs of law enforcement and have the ability to fully conduct 
counterterrorism missions, simply moving a narcotics officer to a position of terrorism 
analysis to save money is not the most advantageous method.130  
Law enforcement officers in departments following the BPD model may not 
satisfy counterterrorism and Homeland Security needs.  Not only were BPD officials not 
trained for this strategy, they did not follow the initiatives set forth by DHS.  Funding by 
the UASI given to positions of intelligence analysts is required to meet specific criteria 
described by the Department of Homeland Security.  According to the U.S. Department 
of Justice Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, these personnel must have 
completed “training to ensure baseline proficiency in intelligence analysis and production 
within six months of being hired or have served as an intelligence analyst for at least two 
years in a federal agency, the military, or state and/or local law enforcement intelligence 
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unit.”131  DHS ensures all intelligence and counterterrorism personnel hired through their 
system meets the requirements laid out in the Global Justice Sharing Initiative’s 
Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for law enforcement and other 
criminal justice agencies in the United States.132 
The civilians hired through the DOJ initiative have been found to have statistical 
and intelligence backgrounds.  Not only have these personnel received all the required 
training, but also they have been found to stay in these positions longer than a sworn 
officer, who typically rotates out of positions every couple of years to keep progressing in 
his or her career. The BPD did not follow the recommendations for hiring properly 
trained personnel in counterterrorism positions and instead utilized internal officers in 
order to save money. 133 
The case study of the BPD shows several advantages of combining already 
established infrastructures to meet the demands of fighting terrorism, however taking too 
many shortcuts can also be extremely counterproductive.  Departments similar to the 
BPD can benefit from utilizing already established infrastructures as long as the 
personnel have been given the proper training requirements and have a career progression 
model established within the department.  If the personnel are not familiar with the 
intelligence analyses process and are not motivated to accomplish the goals due to the 
lack of career enhancement, then mistakes can be made and information can be 
overlooked, which may be a critical piece to the intelligence puzzle. 
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D. THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARMTENT 
Similar to most of the country’s municipalities, the city of Chicago had not 
suffered from a major terrorist attack.  However the threat of terrorism is a real concern 
for Chicago officials.  The city has found itself home to several violent extremists and has 
even been found to be the center of numerous terrorist plots.  David C. Headley, a 
resident in Chicago, assisted the deadly Mumbai Kenya terrorist attack in 2008.  In 
Miami, five individuals associated with a militaristic religious group conspiring with al-
Qaeda to "levy war" against the U.S. allegedly plotted to destroy Chicago’s Sears Tower. 
134 Also the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound found documents that included 
potential plans to attack the city.135  
With multiple threats facing the city as well as the arrival of several international 
dignitaries for two international summits, the Group of Eight and NATO visit in 2012, 
Mayor Rahm Emanuel decided to hire new police superintendent Garry McCarthy to 
begin transitioning the Chicago Police Department (CPD) to incorporate the heavy 
mission of counterterrorism.  McCarthy, who was in New York on September 11, 2001, 
and facilitated the creation of the NYPD counterterrorism strategy, began to transition the 
CPD to bolster security and incorporate lessons learned from academic research on New 
York City’s counterterrorism tactics.  The counterterrorism strategy McCarthy 
incorporated utilized the NYPD’s innovative program on a smaller scale.  The program 
began to hire and train personnel within the department to speak Pashto, Arabic, and 
other languages in order to monitor communication channels.136 
McCarthy’s strategy also involved a heavy reliance on building the strengths of 
local, state, and regional law enforcement assets, academics, and professional expertise in  
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the areas of security and risk management.   This included private sector support and 
cooperation, as well as the strength of Chicago neighborhoods as a potential source of 
cooperation and information. 137  
A Chicago group called Muslims for a Safe America began taking this strategy to 
the doorsteps of Muslims in Chicago to address tensions within the Muslim Community 
about American policies both domestically and internationally.  Unlike the LAPD 
Mapping strategy, this allowed the community to become more willing to work with 
police and to help avoid early mistakes that could hamper the new counterterrorism 
division’s efforts.  Chicago is also home to the nation’s largest chapter of the Council 
American-Islamic Relations.  Having such a large Muslim community requires the new 
counterterrorism strategy to be extremely vigilant and to ensure the strategy does not 
cross the lines on racial profiling and civil liberties. 
The CPD argues it follows directives provided by DHS to support local anti-
terrorism efforts.  This directive outlines coordination procedures that will enhance the 
department’s anti-terrorism preparations and responses. Included in this directive are 
responsibilities to all the members of the CPD counterterrorism division, the Chicago 
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and the Chicago Homeland Security Committee.  The 
directive can be publicly accessed on the department’s website.138 
Once McCarthy’s strategy and transformation becomes a permanent part of the 
CPD, the counterterrorism efforts must be careful not to cross the line over civil liberties.  
Utilizing tactics and strategies from the NYPD’s model may make it very easy to cross 
that line, if not implemented correctly.  Similar to the NYPD, the CPD has not always 
been the model department as far as handling civil liberty issues.  The Department has 
been criticized for illegally invading activist’s homes, such as the home of Joe Iosbaker, 
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organizer of the G8 and NATO protests.139  Controversy also arose over the charges of 
illegal surveillance of the American Friends Service Committee by the CPD and FBI 
related to protests of the 2008 presidential inauguration.140 
E. OTHER MUNICIPALITIES 
Similar to the CPD, other municipalities have felt the threat of terrorism and the 
need to understand the behaviors of their communities without crossing the boundaries of 
racial profiling.  Even though the NYPD continues to utilize the mapping technique, 
other municipalities have looked to the SAR program, as well as active Closed Circuit 
Television cameras (CCTV), which can now utilize behavior recognition software for 
preventive measures.  This new technology combines computer vision with machine 
learning to provide actionable intelligence through real-time, relevant alerting of 
anomalous behavior observed by cameras.141 Several cities have procured this software 
including Boston, Chicago, and recently New York City. 
Several weeks prior to the 2012 Republican National Convention, the city of 
Tampa purchased behavioral recognition software in order to conduct video surveillance 
of the convention and the surrounding area.  The system looked for abnormal activities 
and sent alerts in real time to security personnel within the area.  The software was also 
able to cross reference the information through an intelligence database that had stored 
previous information to look for similarities.  According to an interview with the 
president of BRS Labs John Frazzini, the maker of the recognition software, the program 
is equipped to “detect what is called ‘anomalous’ behavior. It operates on the theory that 
objects appear different from one angle to the next -- and that the behavior of humans in 
one camera may be completely different than the behavior found in another.”142 
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Other smaller local law enforcement agencies continue to develop relationships 
with state and local intelligence fusion centers.  With most states having a main fusion 
center and several regional centers, small departments are beginning to see the 
advantages of participating in a nationwide information sharing initiative.  Recently, the 
Lakewood, Colorado, Police Department, consisting of 400 police officers, received 
intelligence about an individual placing a small-improvised explosive device (IED) at a 
Borders bookstore located at the nearby mall.  The department immediately notified their 
regional fusion center, which in turn notified the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and 
notified several first responder units to immediately report to the scene.  The Colorado 
Information Analysis Center (CIAC) sent the information across the nationwide network 
of fusion centers, requesting any intelligence related to the situation.  Within 15 minutes 
of sending out the request, the CIAC received information from a Terrorism Liaison 
Officer (TLO).  A TLO is a law enforcement personnel who serves as the conduit through 
which homeland security and crime-related information flows from the field to the Fusion 
Center for assessment and analysis.143  Most of the time the TLO is more of a collateral 
duty.  The TLO reported that the individual, 24 hours earlier, had crashed his vehicle and 
was charged with Menacing and Driving Under the Influence of alcohol. The arresting 
officer, after hearing about the IED through the fusion channels, believed the suspect he 
arrested was also the suspect in the bookstore attempt.144  
The CIAC had also received another lead from a different TLO, which connected 
the suspect to another IED that partially detonated near a hotel close to the bookstore.145 
The CIAC was able to forward this information to the FBI JTTF to support the 
investigation.  This is example shows how small town law enforcement departments who 
may not have the funding needed to establish a division devoted to intelligence or 
counterterrorism can still be productive members in the fight against terrorism.  By  
 
                                                 
143 Advisory committee on Fusion Centers, Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Proposal, 
http://osfm.fire.ca.gov/advisorycommittees/pdf/steac/tlotrainingdoc.pdf. 
144 “Fusion Center is Instrumental in the Arrest of an Attempted Bombing Suspect,” Fusion 
Center Success Stories, Colorado Information Analysis Center, June 2011. 
145 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center is Instrumental in the Arrest.” 
 57
simply involving themselves in the national information sharing initiative, they were able 
to send and receive information critical to preventing and prosecuting the individual 
responsible for this attack. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed several different case studies that incorporated different 
strategies in the fight against terrorism.  The LAPD took the initiative of mirroring the 
NYPD’s counterterrorism strategy and suffered severe criticism due to their racial 
profiling efforts of the Muslim community and had to revamp their strategy several times 
before it became what it is today.  Without analyzing the lessons learned or positive 
versus negative aspects of the NYPD model, the organization immediately implemented 
what they thought was an effective effort and learned that mirroring another strategy 
without analyzing the effectiveness of it can cause serious problems and repercussions.  
Unfortunately they learned this through several modifications until they settled on an 
operational strategy. 
The BPD incorporated a fused strategy that took already existing infrastructures 
and added on the responsibility of counterterrorism and intelligence, which had mixed 
results.  The strategy saved the department a lot of money, but forced personnel to take 
on additional responsibilities and placed a heavy burden on those officers to effectively 
accomplish the mission.  This strategy can allow personnel to overlook sensitive 
information that may not seem important at first, but could end up being imperative to the 
big picture.  This proves that the intelligence analyses portion of the counterterrorism 
mission has to be handled by experts in their field and that have had experience and 
training required to obtain the position.  The BPD case is a different perspective of a law 
enforcement agency attempting to combat terrorism within their boundaries.  However, 
through analysis of this chapter, there are many negative aspects of this method that 
makes it unappealing for other municipalities to follow. 
Finally, the CPD, 11 years after the 9/11 attacks, decided to form a 
counterterrorism and intelligence division that concentrated on the efforts from the 
community, drawing on lessons learned from the NYPD’s approach to counterterrorism.  
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With less than a year of implementation, it is difficult to assess the success of the 
strategy.  It will be interesting to see the effects of the new policy in the city of Chicago 
in the future. 
The last chapter summarizes the specific lessons of the NYPD model and suggests 
which aspects would be beneficial to local law enforcement agencies.  This chapter also 
cites examples of preventive measures state and local law enforcement agencies may 
want to consider in the future that are not included in the NYPD model, and examines 
what should be handled at the federal level. 
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V. FINAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
This final chapter examines the NYPD model, with evidence from other 
municipalities examined in chapter four, and gives a final analysis of what aspects of the 
NYPD counterterrorism unit are beneficial for other municipalities to follow, which 
aspects should not be utilized, and possible recommendations that are not utilized in any 
of the models.  This thesis has carefully examined specific NYPD counterterrorism 
tactics, compared those efforts to other municipalities, and will now analyze the 
advantages and disadvantages of those tactics. 
By analyzing the NYPD model, state and local law enforcement leaders around 
the country can learn how critical and important the counterterrorism effort is and begin 
to strategize how to effectively conduct intelligence gathering ad counterterrorism 
missions in their jurisdictions.  This chapter will answer the questions of this thesis; what 
lessons does the New York Police Department model offer for other police departments 
and communities around the United States in fighting against the domestic terrorism 
threat, and what aspects of the NYPD model should be handled at the federal level? 
A. THE DO’S 
What the NYPD has established in their intelligence division is unlike anything 
any other local law enforcement department has been able to accomplish. But even 
though state and local law enforcement agencies have only a fraction of the NYPD 
budget, other agencies could establish some type of intelligence effort with minimal 
fiscal impacts if done correctly.  First, if law enforcement departments around the country 
don’t already have intelligence and counterterrorism divisions implemented in their 
command structure, then they should begin the process of restructuring their 
organization.  This will begin to set the precedence of law enforcement agencies and 
show DHS that state and local police forces are serious about the counterterrorism 
mission.  DHS could potentially introduce long-term investment and grants to develop 
state and local police units as prime intelligence collectors.  Instead of concentrating on 
guidelines that DHS developed through their Target Capabilities List (TCL) that focus on 
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information gathering, intelligence analysis and sharing, and counterterrorism 
investigation, DHS should produce funding for divisions of specially trained investigators 
and analysts that will perform the capabilities in the TCL.146 
Also, implementing intelligence and counterterrorism divisions will organize the 
efforts of a department to focus on the task at hand, which is to foil a terrorist attack.  
This thesis demonstrates the benefits of having both analysts, who can interpret the data 
and intelligence from out in the field, and field operatives, who are gathering the 
intelligence and searching for clues.  As this thesis has shown, the massive amounts of 
intelligence data that gets compiled is far too extensive and time consuming for a law 
enforcement officer working in multiple divisions to handle.  Implementing a separate 
division will allow counterterrorism specialists the resources, personnel, and capacity to 
effectively operate in a counterterrorism atmosphere.  As chapter four has discussed, it is 
very difficult to fuse different missions with already existing departments.  The most 
efficient and effective way to conduct intelligence and counterterrorism missions is to 
separate the responsibility and to allow the specialists assigned to the mission the ability 
to concentrate on the task. 
Second, once a division has been established, only the most qualified personnel 
should be hired to fill these positions.  Law enforcement leaders need to understand the 
attributes required of these unique positions and, if needed, receive guidance from 
members of already established and successful departments, for instance NYPD or even 
DHS.  The NYPD case has shown how competitive, experienced, and qualified 
counterterrorism positions are.  The NYPD has even gone to the extent of hiring strictly 
Ivy League graduates or personnel with several years of experience in some sort of 
intelligence field.  Once the guidelines have been established for hiring intelligence and 
counterterrorism officers, leadership must ensure there is an upward trend in promotion 
similar to any other federal intelligence agency.  In order to attract the highest-quality 
intelligence officer or analyst for employment, forward mobility will need to be explicit 
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within the job description.  No personnel with the credentials required for this position 
would pursue landing a dead end job with no opportunity for advancement. 
Third, once a counterterrorism unit with qualified personnel is underway, these 
units should then focus on sharing gathered intelligence laterally throughout the state and 
country among local police organizations.  Priority should be to share the information 
through regional fusion centers. However, if certain organizations are not equipped to 
follow the guidelines established by the Fusion Center Guidelines report, then local 
authorities must have a way to communicate with each other in terms of information 
sharing.  The NYPD’s Sentry Program is a unique and perfect example of how other 
states can communicate laterally.  This program involves over 125 representatives from 
different New York state and local law enforcement agencies focusing on information 
gathering and sharing to detect and if necessary defeat threats of terrorism.147  This type 
of relationship generates a trust that can ultimately lead to the sharing of vital 
information. 
Finally, counterterrorism experts and leaders of an organization must constantly 
communicate with their community.  They should not focus on any specific type of 
religion or ethnicity.  This would cause the organization to fall victim to racial profiling, 
which would lose the trust of the community.  Law enforcement personnel need to 
develop ways that allows the community of all different races and religious beliefs to feel 
comfortable opening up to the officers and report anything suspicious. 
Religious leaders, especially in the American Muslim community, can be 
consulted with in order address tensions within those communities about American 
policies in this country and abroad.148  With an effective communication strategy 
between law enforcement and the community, intelligence needed to prevent a crime or 
terrorist activity can be developed and individuals can be discouraged from attempting to 
radicalize. 
                                                 
147 NYPD Press release, NYPD Convenes Operation Sentry Members for Annual Conference 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/pr_2009_ph10.shtml. 
148 Wolfgang Bartelme, “In The Media,” Muslims For A Safe America, Assessed on March 
03, 2013, http://muslimsforasafeamerica.org/?page_id=55. 
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B. THE DO NOTS AND WHAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FEDERAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Although the NYPD has been labeled the model for other municipalities to 
follow, there are a few tactics that the department has employed that have been 
scrutinized and found to have little to no significance in the fight against terrorism.  First, 
police organizations need to be especially careful not to cross the line on two important 
issues: civil liberties and racial profiling.  The ethnic mapping techniques utilized by both 
the NYPD and LAPD have infuriated many innocent Muslim civilians.  The main 
critique of the mapping process has been that this tactic diverts resources to “map” U.S. 
communities based on their religious beliefs, ethnic orientation, and national 
characteristics, focusing primarily on Arab American and Muslim communities as 
potential terrorist for recruitment.149  Singling out an ethnicity, race, or religious belief is 
profiling.  The LAPD case study proves that this tactic can ruin efforts to communicate 
and work with different communities.  
Chapter two discusses why local law enforcement is the perfect tool for the 
counterterrorism mission.  Violating the civil liberties of U.S. citizens and singling out 
ethnicities and religious group will only limit the ability to share information.  The 
community is the eyes and ears for law enforcement.  A police officer’s relationship with 
the everyday citizen creates that trust that no federal enforcement officer can create.  By 
violating civil liberties and committing racial profiling, that trust can disappear, which 
results in the loss of the most important of counterterrorism intelligence.  
Second, police departments should focus on the responsibilities of 
counterterrorism efforts within the departments’ own jurisdiction.  Organizations who 
venture into other department’s areas will only ruin the relationships needed for sharing 
intelligence.  As the NYPD example proves, in the case of the surveillance operations of 
NYPD officers in New Jersey, the monitoring efforts hindered investigations conducted 
                                                 
149 Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Scrutinized for Amassing Data on American Communities, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at A20, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/us/ aclu-releases-fbi-
documents-on-american-communities.html?_r=1&hpw. 
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by Newark police and the FBI, and created additional risks in counterterrorism.150  Not 
only have these efforts hindered investigations conducted by the enforcement agencies 
responsible for that area, but they also damaged the public's trust in New Jersey law 
enforcement and jeopardized many of the relationships agents had developed in the 
community since 9/11.151 
Third, police departments should not act independently in the mission of 
counterterrorism.  There is an initiative devoted to sharing intelligence on a national 
level.  Information is constantly being updated and analyzed and could either be useful to 
the small municipality examining a lead, or the information analyzed by a small 
municipality could benefit an organization in a different area. 
As fiscal restraints continue to limit the capabilities of law enforcement agencies, 
it will be difficult for an organization to acquire the capabilities that the NYPD has 
developed over the last ten years.  This makes it even more important for organizations 
not to act alone.  The FBI has a wide array of capabilities that can assist local entities in 
their efforts in counterterrorism.  Unlike the NYPD, who has been known for their 
inability to work effectively with their FBI counterparts, localities should look for 
assistance whenever they can in order to maximize their ability to prevent a terrorist 
attack.  Whether it involves a federal authority, for instance the FBI or representatives for 
DHS, or even other local authorities, every possible capability should be exploited. 
Finally, there are aspects of the NYPD that should not be considered part of a 
local or state enforcement strategy against terrorism.  With a strong sharing initiative 
between law enforcement departments from both state and federal entities, deploying 
state and local officers overseas would be a waste of money and resources.  This strategy 
employed by the NYPD specifically should be handled at the federal level.  There are 
federal law enforcement officers deployed to every U.S. Embassy who constantly report 
and investigate leads or events.  By simply developing a relationship with the FBI 
                                                 
150 Samantha Henry, “NJ FBI: NYPD monitoring damaged public trust,” Associated Press, 
March 7, 2012, http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NJ-FBI-NYPD-monitoring-
damaged-public-trust. 
151 Henry, “NJ FBI.” 
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counterterrorism counterparts located at the nearby JTTF, law enforcement officers 
looking to research intelligence overseas can utilize federal employees to obtain that 
information. 
C. OTHER ADDITIONS TO THE COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION 
Education and training personnel on intelligence and counterterrorism has turned 
out to be quite costly and inefficient for both federal agencies and municipalities.  The 
NYPD spends millions of dollars to bring in counterterrorism experts to provide training 
on counter-terrorism and intelligence issues for their officers.  These programs have no 
syllabus or instructional portfolio to follow.  The instructors have no uniform standard for 
hiring or evaluation.  They are simply hired for their experience and knowledge in the 
field of terrorism.  The fact that the NYPD can spend the money to acquire these 
“experts” does not help the rest of police organizations around the country to learn the 
proper techniques and knowledge of how to conduct proper intelligence gathering and 
counterterrorism efforts.152 
Police departments around the country need to develop a universal syllabus that 
provides efficient and effective instruction on counterterrorism to police officers.  This 
instructional doctrine can be utilized throughout different cities in order to decrease the 
risk of misunderstanding among different law enforcement agencies.  Once a training 
doctrine is created, police departments can begin to select trainers to effectively teach the 
required material.  These trainers should be critiqued and evaluated to ensure proper 
standards are emplaced.  This system of education would be extremely cost effective 
considering the instructors are from the department and already receive a salary.  The 
system should then focus on providing senior law enforcement leaders specialized 
courses, what the military describes as “Train the Trainer,” to ensure the knowledge is 
provided effectively. 
                                                 
152 Brian Fishman and Andrew Lebovich, “Countering Domestic Radicalization, Lessons for 
Intelligence Collection and Community Outreach,” New American Foundation, June 2011, 9. 
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D. CONCLUSION  
As demonstrated in this thesis, the NYPD provides a series of good practices that 
other municipalities could follow.  It gives organizations the guidelines to start their own 
unique intelligence and counterterrorism divisions within their establishments.  State 
entities need to begin taking the fight against terrorism seriously and stop relying on the 
federal government to conduct counterterrorism operation.  The NYPD has taken the 
fight against terrorism personally and is willing and able to do whatever it takes to 
prevent another 9/11 style attack on their soil.  States need to hold themselves responsible 
for the prevention of homegrown domestic terrorism, and become more aggressive in 
their fight to prevent this increasing threat. The Heritage Foundation reported in April 
2012 that 50 serious homegrown terrorist plots had been foiled since 9/11.153  This 
number continually rises year to year and proves that there are people in this world who 
wish harm to Americans, which require more emphases on the counterterrorism mission 
our nation faces. 
 If organizations haven’t already begun incorporating intelligence and 
counterterrorism divisions within their organizations, they need to do so.  If they haven’t 
included information sharing capabilities in their immediate goals with either regional 
fusion centers or with other local entities, they need to do so.  And lastly, state 
organizations need to begin training their personnel to effectively operate in the 
intelligence and counterterrorism field either by establishing state and local law 
enforcement intelligence schools or developing a syllabus and training doctrine that 
facilities the proper needs in order to produce the top intelligence officers need to excel in 
this mission area.  Although the NYPD has stirred up criticism in the debate over 
domestic intelligence, their methods prove successful considering there hasn’t been a 
successful terrorist attack in NYC.  Their aggressiveness has put several suspects 
committed of homegrown terrorism behind bars and has prevented these individuals from 
committing terrorist attacks.  States need to take responsibility for the fight against 
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homegrown terrorism and establish their own model following the specific lessons 
learned by the NYPD described in this thesis. 
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